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nical meaning, as contradistinguished from the words "next of kin,"
which last-mentioned phraseology is to be found in the statute of
distributions. But there seems to be nothing in this argument.
Next of kin is only another word for next in consanguinity, and
"kinsmen" is an exact translation of the word "consanguinii." The
real ground for the adoption of the civil law rule of computation,
under the statute of distributions, was simply because the policy of
equal distribution to persons standing in the same degree of proximity to the intestate was adopted: a principle inconsistent with the
canon law rule. Our statutes of descent, in their spirit, are entirely inconsistent with the policy of the English law of descent.
The English law seeks for a single person-the heir at law. Our
statutes seek to distribute the estate, in respect of collaterals,
among all next of kin and in equal degree of consanguinity. The
results would be very incongruous in attempting to apply the canon
law rule. Thus, living uncles and their children, as also the children of deceased uncles, being all in the second degree, under that
rule of computation would take as tenants in common in equal
parts; for, under the sixth section of the statute of New Jersey,
the collateral heirs take per capita only. But the civil law rule
of computation is generally understood to be the rule adopted in
New Jersey. It was so lately expressly decided by Chancellor Green
(then Chief Justice) in December, 1859, when, on application to him
by a cousin to divide lands, he held that the lands of an intestate
went to living uncles, to the exclusion of the children of deceased
C.
uncles and aunts.
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In the United States Circuit Court.-New Jersey District.
In Ejectment.
DEN EX. DEI. ROBERTS AND WIFE ET AL. VS. MOORE.
1. The act of limitations of New Jersey, limiting'the right of entry on lands to
twenty years, provides that in case of certain disabilities, the time during which
the person who shall have the right of entry, shall be under any such disability,
shall not be taken or computed as part of said period of twenty years. -eld,
that when the statute has once begun to run, it will continue to run over all
subsequent disabilities.
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2. The ruling of the Supreme Court of New Jersey, in Den d. Clark vs. Richards,
(3 Green, 347,) approved.
3. A refusal by one tenant in common to let his co-tenant come in or participate in
the enjoyment of the common property, is equivalent to turning him out, and
constitutes an adverse possession.
4. The possession of lands by an agent or manager, is an actual possession, within
the meaning of the thirty years act of New Jersey, and constitutes an adverse
possession as against a co-tenant.

'Voorhees and IW.L. Dayton, for plaintiffs.
( arpenter and Browning, for defendant.
This wai an pction of ejectment for an undivided portion of a
large tract of land in Atlantic county, New Jersey, known as the
"Weymouth Furnace Tract," tried before his honor, Mr. Justice
Grier, at Trenton, at September Term, 1860.
Both parties claimed under Joseph Ball, who died in 1821 intestate, without issue, or brother or sister of the whole or half-blood,
or representative of such brother or sister, or father or mother, capable of inheriting. His nearest relatives were a surviving uncle
and aunt, and forty-one cousins, some of whom were the children of
said uncle and aunt, and others of deceased uncles and aunts. At
the time of his decease he owned, in fee, three-eighths of the said
tract, containing about sixty thousand acres, with furnace, &c., on
it, as tenant in common with Samuel Richards, who owned also
three-eighths, and Mrs. Condit, who owned one-fourth.
Shortly after the death of Mr. Ball, and more than thirty years
before the commencement of this suit, Samuel Richards, supposing
that the uncle and aunt were the only heirs, to the exclusion of the
cousins, purchased the aunt's interest, and took a deed from her;
and also the uncle's interest from his heirs-he having died, intestate, before the purchase. Having thus procured the Ball interest,
he purchased out also Mrs. Condit in 1829, and thereby became, as
he supposed, the sole owner of the property, and continued to carry
on the furnace, and to cut and convert the timber and lumber on the
premises to his own use until 1842, when be died, leaving a will, by
which he devised the entire tract with the furnace to his two daughters, the wives of Stephen Colwell and Walter D. Bell, Esquires, of
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Philadelphia, who have ever since eld these lands, (except portions
sold off within seven years past,) and carried on the furnace upon
them, cutting the wood and timber at pleasure.
Among the cousins left by Joseph Ball, were Sarah Johnson, a
widow, who continued so until her death, in 1828; and Abraham
Smith, who died in 1832; and George Custer, who died in 1829.
There were nine lessors of the plaintiff-three of them were the
children of Sarah Johnson, and were married women when she
died; one was a daughter of Abraham Smith, and was married
when he died; and five were daughters of George Custer, and were
married when he died. The husbands of four of these lessors were
still living, and joined in the suit; the husbands of the other five
were dead, but the time since their deaths added to-the time which
had elapsed between the death of Mr. Ball and their respective parents, as above stated, would in no instance make twenty years, so
that, if barred by the Statute of Limitations, it must be on the principle, that the statute began to run against the parents before their
death, and afterwards continued, notwithstanding the coverture of
the lessors.
The suit was commenced in 1858, more than thirty years after
the conveyances by the surviving aunt and by the heirs of the surviving uncle of Mr. Ball, and more than twenty after the said three
cousins, under whom the lessors of the plaintiff claimed, had died.
There had been no claim made by or under any of the cousins of
Mr. Ball, from the time of his death in 1821 to the commencement
of this suit in 1858-a period of between thirty-seven and thirtyeight years.
By the Statute of Descents in New Jersey, in default of issue,
and of brothers and sisters and any descendants of them, and of
father and mother, the land descends, equally, to the next "in degree of consanguinity" to the intestate, however remote; and the
Statute of Limitations provides, that "thirty years actual possession of land, uninterruptedly continued, wherever such possession
was obtained by a fair bona fide purchase of any person in possession and supposed to have a legal right and title thereto, shall vest
an absolute right and title in the actual possessor;" provided that
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any person under legal disability, when his or her "right or title
first accrued," shall have five years to sue after the disability shall
be removed. Another section of the statute provides, that no person shall enter on lands, "but within twenty years next after his or
her right or title shall accrue," provided that the time during which
such person "shall have been under the age of twenty-one years,
feme covert, or insane, shall not be taken or computed as a part of
the said limited period of twenty years."
Two questions were presented by this case:1. Whether under the New Jersey Statute of Descents, above
stated, giving the land to the next "in degree of consanguinity,"
the surviving uncle and aunt took to the exclusion of cousins,
or in common with them-whether, in computing degrees of kindred, the count was according to the civil or canon law ? If
by the former, which reckons from the intestate to the common
ancestor and then down to the claimant, then the uncle and aunt
were the only heirs, for they were in the third degree, and cousins in the fourth. But if by the canon law, which reckons from
the common ancestor down to the more remote of the two-the intestate or claimant, then the cousins would inherit with the uncle
and aunt; for an uncle and cousin are both in the second degree.
This question the court reserved to decide upon argument, if the
jury should render their verdict in favor of the plaintiff'on the
other question. But, as the jury found for defendant, no opinion
was given on this point.
2. Whether, under the evidence in this case, the lessors of the
plaintiff were barred by the Statute of Limitations, above referred to ? On this point, the judge charged the jury, in substance,
as follows:GRIER, J.-From the evidence in this case it appears, that one
Joseph Ball, who died in April, 1821, intestate, was seized of
three-eighths of the Weymouth Furnace tract, containing some
sixty thousand acres of land in Gloucester (now Atlantic) county,
in this State. He left no issue, brother or sister of either the
whole or half-blood, or representative of them; or father or mother
capable of inheriting. His nearest relations were a surviving uncle
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and aunt and some forty-one cousins, children as well of such uncle
and aunt as of deceased uncles and aunts. His interest in these
lands descended to his heirs; but whether, by a proper construction of the Statute of Descents in this State, these heirs were the
surviving uncle and aunt only, to the exclusion of the cousins, or
whether they took, equally, with the cousins, is a question which
this court has reserved to itself for future consideration, if it should
become necessary to decide it after your verdict upon the other
parts of the case. But it would seem to be very clear, from the
evidence, that at that time the uncle and aunt supposed they were
the only heirs, and so acted; and that the cousins, who could not
have been ignorant of this property, acquiesced in this assumption.
For the present, however, we will suppose that the construction,
which then seems to have been given to this statute, was wrong;
and that, instead of this estate descending wholly to the uncle and
aunt, they took it in common with the forty-one cousins. The
question now is, whether their rights are barred by the Statute of
Limitations ?
In determining this question, it is your duty to take the law
from the court, and apply it to the facts of the case, as given in
evidence.
Statutes of Limitation are statutes of repose, and should be
fairly and honestly executed. They are for the peace of society.
Indeed, the well-being of society demands their faithful execution.
The getting-up of latent claims, to the disturbance of possessions
of long standing, if encouraged, would be an intolerable mischief to
any community.
When Mr. Ball died, all his next of kin came forward, and
claimed his personal estate. Legal proceedings were instituted
and prosecuted for its distribution among them. The cousins
made no claim to these lands, of which they could not have been
ignorant. Indeed, they assented to, or at least acquiesced in, the
claims of their uncle and aunt, so that the construction now sought
to be given to the Statute of Descents is a new discovery. If they
were then under a mistake, and suffered others to take possession
,9 f lands as their own which belonged to them in common, this was
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a voluntary ouster, or rather the confession of ouster on their part;
and it is now, at the expiration of nearly forty years, too late to
correct this error, if it was an error.
One of the sections of your Statute of Limitation provides, that
"no person shall enter upon any lands; tenements, and hereditaments, but within twenty years after his or her right or title shall
accrue ;" provided that the time during which such person "shall
be under the age of twenty-one years, ferns covert, or insane, shall
not be computed as part of the said limited period of twenty years."
Although the phraseology here used is different from the English
statute, it is, in my opinion, in substance the same; and under the
English act, as well as under similar acts in this country, it has long
been a well-established principle, that when the statute once begins
to run, it continues to run over all intervening disabilities: that is,
if when the title accrues to a female, she should be a single woman,
although she should subsequently marry before the expiration of the
twenty years, yet the statute would run on the same as if such marriage had not occurred; and at the expiration of the twenty years
her title would be gone, the same as if she had not married. This
is a sound and well-settled construction of the English act, and, I
think, it is also the true construction to be given to this act. Any
other construction would stultify the Legislature, and render useless
the act itself. Instead of being a statute of repose, it would open
the way for the very mischiefs it was intended to remedy-dormant claims might be continued for a century, and then wakened
up to the serious disturbance of long-established possessions.
Whilst I feel myself bound to follow the constructions given by the
State Courts to their own statutes, although differing from them,
yet I entirely concur in the opinion of your own Supreme Court,
made in 1836, in the case of Den vs. Clarke 3 Green Rep. 347.
[The judge here read a paragraph from the opinion delivered by
Chief Justice Hornblower.] This is the law of your State, as declared by your Supreme Court more than twenty years ago; twice
subsequently affirmed by the same court in the years 1844 and
1845. I concur in it, as a sound exposition of the act. The dictum of Judge Washington, referred to in 4 Wash. C. C. Rep., how-
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ever much entitled to respect, as coming from that distinguished
jurist, appears to have been hastily expressed, without the advantage of an argument, and cannot therefore be regarded as well considered.
It would certainly be an indiscreet and dangerous exercise of judicial discretion, after a statute affecting title to real property had
received the construction of your own courts, to express even a
doubt of its correctness. To reverse such decisions, after they have
become rules of property, might unsettle titles, increase litigation,
and work intolerable evils. Especially, since the modern discovery
of short judicial terms and frequent elections, would this evil be intensely magnified, if in such cases, as often happens, the last judge
should affect to exhibit his wisdom by overruling his predecessor.
Change of law by statute operates only on the future; but, if made
by judicial decision, it re-acts on the past, and may destroy titles
before valid and undoubted.
If the construction of this statute by your courts had worked injustice, the people of New Jersey could have annulled it almost any
day by legislation; and if for over twenty years it has been received
and acquiesced in, as the true construction of a statute so deeply affecting title to real property, it may be said to have the unanimous
consent of the whole people. I concur with the learned Chief Justice in the decision; if I did not I would not venture to doubt its
conclusiveness.
If, then, there has been an adverse possession by the defendaht
in this case, and those under whom he claims, for twenty years,
and if that adverse possession commenced to run against persons
under no legal disability, their right of entry is barred, whatever
disabilities may have subsequently occurred; and if you believe the
defendant's witnesses, they prove such adverse possession.
It appears, by the evidence in this cause, that the lessors of the
plaintiff claim under three of the cousins of Joseph Ball, who were
living at the time of his decease, in 1821. One of these cousins
was then a widow, and so continued for more than seven years
after, when she died, leaving daughters, who were then married
women. The other two cousins were men, who lived from eight to
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eleven years after Joseph Ball; and at their deaths, their interests
(if any) vested in their daughters, who were then married. If the
statute commenced to run against these cousins before their respective deaths, it continued on, although their heirs were married women, and have so continued ever since.
Adverse possession means holding adversely, or in opposition to,
the true owner. This may be by one tenant in common against his
co-tenant, as well as when no co-tenancy exists. It is true, as a
general rule, that the possession of one joint tenant, or tenant in
common, is the possession of the other; and that a mere failure to
account for the proceeds by the tenant in actual possession does
not amount to an ouster. But there need be no actual turning out.
A refusal by one joint tenant, or tenant in common, to let his cotenant come in, or to participate in the enjoyment of the common
property, is equivalent to turning him out. It is a question of intent by the actual occupant, and this intention may appear as well
by actions as by words. It requires no special or verbal notice, but
may be inferred from outward acts. Open and notorious claim of
ownership, and exercise of exclusive right, amount to actual ouster.
If one take possession of property under a mistake in.law, supposing it to be his, and the real owner-standing by-acquiesces, his
conduct is a voluntary or confessed ouster on his part, and he cannot afterwards, when he discovers the mistake, say such possession
was not adverse. If, then, you believe that when Mr. Ball died,
all parties supposed that his surviving uncle and aunt were his only
heirs, and that subsequently Mr. Richards purchased from them or
their heirs, and has held possession under these conveyances for
more than twenty years, the plaintiffs are barred from recovering
in this case.
I think, also, the thirty /ears limitation applies to this case: possession by an agent or manager, is actual possession within the meaning of the statute. If, upon the death of Mr. Ball, it was supposed by
all the cousins that the property descended to the uncle and aunt,
and the tenant or manager acknowledged them as the owner, they
may be considered to have been in possession; and the deeds made
by them or their heirs bona fide and for a valuable consideration,
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are such conveyances as that actual possession under them for thirty
years, would give title.
The conduct of the cousins clearly shows, that they considered
themselves ousted; and the conduct of Mr. Richards, in his long
enjoyment as sole and absolute owner, cutting off all the timber,
and in many instances re-cutting it, and in the open and extensive
business continually carried on upon the premises for himself, and
for no other, shows an adverse holding by him, if you believe the
witnesses.
If you find a verdict for the plaintiffs, you need not trouble yourselves about cyphering out the minute fractional parts to which they
may be entitled: but if you find for the defendant, you will have
only so to state, and that will end the controversy.

In the Circuit Court of the United States for the Bastern District
of Pennsylvania-In-Equity.
LAURA KEENE vs. WHEATLEY & CLARKE.
A party asserting her literary proprietorship of an unprinted comedy, under an
assignment to her by its author, complained of its theatrical representation by
the defendants, without her consent. It had been composed in England for
performance at a London theatre.
Difficulties of adaptation preventing its
performance there, it was thrown back on the hands of the author. He, subsequently, not being a citizen, or a resident of the United States, for a valuable
consideration, transferred his proprietorship of it for the United States to the
complainant, a resident of New York, where she was the proprietor and manager
She adopted measures for securing a copyright; and, in so doing,

of a theatre.

performed all such acts prescribed by statutes of the United States as were
performable without a publication in print. The play, under her management,
was adapted to representation at her theatre, with the assistance of an actor of
her company, to whom the principal character was allotted; and, in the course
of this adaptation, received written additions, underwent curtailment, and was
otherwise altered. The additions were made or suggested by this actor. The
play, as composed in England, or as thus altered, was never printed. As altered
and adapted, it was publicly represented at the complainant's theatre. Here,
the same actor, in performing the principal character, introduced, with a view to
stage effect, some unwritten additions, relying for the repetition of them, upon
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his memory alone. The representation at the complainant's theatre having been
successful, the defendants, proprietors and managers of a theatre at Philadelphia,
afterwards performed the play, against her will, at their theatre, imitating closely
the general and particular performance of it, as it had been represented by her.
They had witnessed its performance at her theatre; but this, whatever assistance
it may have afforded them, was not the means of enabling them to represent it
themselves. They obtained the contents of the English manuscript from a former
copy, which had been unauthorizedly retained, or made, by a player at the London
theatre for which it had been composed. The additions, written and unwritten,
were, without the permission of the complainant, communicated to them by the
same actor who had, under her management, introduced them at her theatre.
As the author was a non-resident alien, the complainant, though herself a
resident of the United States, could not, as proprietor of the play, sustain her
suit upon the statutes of the United States for the protection of authors and their
assigns.
But, independently of this legislation, the court, having, through the citizenship
of the parties, a general equitable jurisdiction in the case, the suit was sustained"
The foreign author's assignment, if to be deemed a partial one, was, at law,
inoperative, except as a license; but, having been for a valuable consideration,
was, in equity, valid, as an assignment, for the United States, of such literary
property as could exist in his composition.
The play never having been published in print, the complainant, as its literary
proprietor, could have sustained her suit if she had not herself represented it
theatrically before an indiscriminate audience.
A publication, literary or dramatic, may be limited or general. It is general,
whenever the communication effecting it is not restricted, both as to the persons
to whom, and the purpose for which, it is made. When general, it is a dedication
to the public for such unlimited uses, including all modes of publishing and
republishing, as it may be the means of directly or secondarily enabling any
person to make. The complainant's prior performance of the play at her own
theatre was a general publication. Therefore, if it had been the means of
directly or secondarily enabling the defendants to represent it through a retention
of its words in their own memory, or in that of others of her audience, her literary
proprietorship could not have been so asserted as to enable her to maintain her
suit.
But the literary proprietorship of an author and his assigns continues after a
general publication, except so far as it may be the means of enabling others to
make ulterior publication, or otherwise to use the composition published. Therefore, as the complainant's prior public performance of the play was not the means
through which the defendants were enabled to represent it, her suit was maintainable on the foundation of literary property, notwithstanding such prior
performance.
The written additions to the former manuscript were not independent literary
productions, but accessions whose proprietorship was incidental to that of the
principal composition.
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Had this been otherwise, their literary proprietorship would have been in the
complainant, and not in the actor who conceived and suggested them when he was
in her service assisting her in adapting the drama to its intended first peiformance. His relation to her, as his employer, precluded him from acquiring, under
such circumstances, an independent interest of his own in such products of his
mental exertion in her service.
His unwritten additions were not capable of being the subjects of literary
proprietorship in any body. But, independently of any question of proprietary
right, the complainant, having the advantage of her priority in the performance
of this play, and being engaged in a professional competition in which the
retention of this advantage would have been profitable to her, hia communication
to her professional rivals and competitors of the written, as well as unwritten,
additions, was a breach of confidence on his part, from which a Court of Equity
would not permit the defendants to derive an advantage to her prejudice, or to
retain an advantage thus derived.
The additions, written and unwritten, and the incidental curtailments and
alterations, having been the means by which the play, as a whole, was adapted
successfully to dramatic representation, this equitable doctrine was, independently
of any question of literary proprietorship, applicable to the whole play as acted
by the complainant, and imitated by the defendants, including the former
composition to which the additions were adapted, so far as it was retained.
In equity, an amendment of the bill, when allowed after answer and replication,
does not open the pleadings unrestrictedly. The Court looks back through them
in order to ascertain to what extent, if any, the amendment may have introduced
a new case, or new matter; and, in general, considers them as open to this extent,
but no farther.
An amendment of the bill, after answer, does not sanction the introduction on
the part of the defendant, by way of plea, of an allegation of a personal disability
in the complainant as having existed at the commencement of the suit.

The

answer itself would overrule such a plea.

The facts of the case are sufficiently stated in the following
opinion:
CADWALADER, J.-The comedy called "Our American Cousin,"
is described by the defendants, in their answer, as a "piece presenting, in suitable situations, those eccentricities usually attributed on
the stage to Yankees." It was never printed, and has never been
published otherwise than through dramatic representation. It was
composed in England, in 1852, by a dramatic author named Taylor,
for performance in London at the Adelphi Theatre, of which Benjamin Webster was the manager. Mr. Taylor in that year sold it,
or the right of performing it, to Mr. Webster. Insuperable difficul-
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ties of adaptation preventing its performance there, it was thrown
back on Mr. Taylor's hands. In 1855 it again became his absolute property, under an arrangement by which another drama of
his composition was exchanged by him, for it, with Webster. The
manuscript was then returned to him by Webster. As then written,
it was in two acts. Mr. Taylor afterwards changed its arrangement
by dividing it into three acts, and also made some trivial changes in
the text. The manuscript was then fairly re-written by his wife.
In the autumn of 1858, he, for a valuable consideration, transferred
all his literary and dramatic proprietary rights in it, for the United
States, to the complainant, who is the lessee and proprietor of a theatre at New York. At the close of September, 1858, she received
from his agent at New York the manuscript, in Mrs. Taylor's handwriting. In the adaptation of the piece for its intended performance
at the complainant's theatre, she was assisted by Joseph Jefferson,
an actor of her company, whom the defendants describe in their answer, as a comedian of tact and talent. The principal part in the
play, called the Yankee character, was allotted to him. The manuscript underwent curtailment and alteration, and received additions.
More than three-fifths of the dialogue in one scene, and the fourth
of another, were struck out, besides the erasure of many passages
in other scenes. The additions were chiefly in the character allotted to Mir. Jefferson. Those in this character, if not in the others,
were made or suggested by himself. The curtailments and alterations, and some of the additions, were made with a lead pencil on
the manuscript, which had been received by the complainant from
the author. This manuscript having been written with ink, the author's composition, in the precise form in which he transferred it, is
distinctly preserved. The manuscript was exhibited to him when
he was examined in this cause, under a commission to London. He
then deposed, that these alterations, made since he parted with it,
were in a handwriting unknown to him. After the return of the
commission, the manuscript thus altered was proved, by a witness
examined at New York, to be the one from which the piece was
played at the complainant's theatre. Thus, in the text in ink we
have the English composition, and in the writing in pencil we have

LAURA KEENE vs. WHEATLEY & CLARKE.

some of the adaptations made under the complainant's management.
The text in ink having been written on one side only of the paper,
many of the pencil additions are on the former blank sides. They
are, in other instances, written over pencil erasures, or interlined.
The former text is nowhere obliterated or illegible. The manuscript
contains references to other additions, as having been introduced at
New York. These must have been written on other sheets, which
have not been produced in evidence.
The play, when thus altered and adapted, was acted at the complainant's theatre, on the 18th of October, 1858. This was its first
representation on any stage. The success of it was complete. Its
performance was constantly repeated, with continued success, for
many months.
The defendants are lessees and managers of a theatre in Philadelphia. They knew, between the 10th and the 17th of November,
1858, if not earlier, that the complainant asserted, under Mr. Taylor, as the author of this play, an exclusive literary proprietorship
and sole right of dramatic representation of it in the United States.
They were informed that she was willing, for a price named by her
agent, to sell to them the right of acting it in Philadelphia. One
of them replied, that they already had it, and intended to play it
in Philadelphia. The manner in which they procured it has been
since disclosed.
Joshua Silsbee, an American actor, was, in 1852, a performer in
Mr. Webster's theatrical company, at the Adelphi Theatre in London. In 1852, Mr. Taylor, the author, was told by Silsbee, that
he had a copy of the manuscript in his possession, for the purpose
of studying the Yankee character. Mr. Webster, then the proprietor of the play, deposed, that he never gave to Silsbee a copy, or
permission to have one; and that, if he had one, he must have obtained it surreptitiously. The defendants allege, in their answer,
that the parts in the play were cast in England, when this character
was allotted to Silsbee, whom they describe as capable of imparting
to it those peculiarfeaturesand touches upon which the success of
the play would, in a great measure, depend. They also allege, that
the piece was rehearsed at the Adelphi Theatre in 1852, prepara-
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torily to its intended performance there. These allegations appear
to have been founded altogether in error. The evidence is very
distinct, that it never was rehearsed in England. There is no evidence that anything was done with a view to its intended rehearsal,
or that the characters were, in whole or in part, even provisionally
cast. They cannot, consistently with the evidence, have been deftnitively cast with Mr. Webster's concurrence. They possibly may
have been provisionally, or conjecturally, cast by somebody, perhaps by Mr. Silsbee, who, as a performer at that theatre, expected
to act the Yankee character, if the play should be represented there.
But, according to Webster's testimony, strengthened by that of Taylor, no part in the piece was ever allotted to Silsbee, or to any other
actor in Webster's company. Mr. Webster, as manager, was very
strongly of opinion, that Mr. Silsbee was incapable of performing
the Yankee part with success. He had previously failed at that theatre in such parts. In this unfavorable opinion, Mr. Taylor, the author, decidedly concurred. On this point, if the testimony had been
impeached, it would have been confirmed by two letters of the year
1852, from Taylor to Webster, concerning the difficulties of adapting this character to the capacity of Mr. Silsbee, or of any other
performer at the Adelphi Theatre. This appears to have been a
chief cause of its non-performance there. A copy of the manuscript
must, however, have been in Mr. Silsbee's possession, and have been
retained by him. His possession of it, if ever known by Webster,
must have been overlooked, and afterwards forgotten. Silsbee returned to the United States, bringing it with him, and subsequently,
in 1855, when still in possession of it, died in California. It passed,
after his death, into the possession of his widow, who subsequently
became the wife of William Chapman. Mrs. Chapman has not been
examined by the defendants as a witness, though the principal allegations of their answer must, if true, have depended upon information which cannot, probably, have been derived from any other person. Of the truth of these principal allegations, they cannot have
had any direct knowledge of their own. There is no evidence that
Mrs. Chapman's attention, or that of any one else in the United
States, was attracted to the copy of the manuscript in her posses-
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sion, until after the public announcement, at New York, of the intended performance of the play at the complainant's theatre. There
is no reason to believe that the existence of this copy was known to
the defendants until after this announcement, or, indeed, until after
the successful representation of the piece at her theatre. All that
we really know concerning the copy is, that it passed, at about this
time, into the possession of the defendants from that of Mrs. Chapman, and that Mr. Silsbee, her former husband, had obtained possession of it when he was a player in Webster's company. The defendants now claim, as will be stated hereafter, a right of using this
copy under a title which, they assert, was vested in Silsbee. As
they assert this claim, his own statement, that he had possession of
it for the purpose of studying a part in it, is evidence against them
of the purpose for which he obtained the possession. The statement
might have been true, though the parts were not cast, nor any definitive allotment of this part made. The inference from the testimony least unfavorable to his memory is, that he may have thus
obtained the copy in the first instance, and that his retention of it
was afterwards overlooked, or disregarded. We cannot, upon the
testimony, believe, or assume, that he retained the possession of it
with any direct permission from Webster. But such permission,
had it been obtained, would not have authorized Silsbee, if living,
to make any public use of the copy, or to sanction any such use by
others. Of course, no party coming, after his death, into possession
of it under him, could give a legal sanction to any such use of it by
the defendants.
After they had obtained this copy from Mrs. Chapman, the
defendant Clarke procured from Mr. Jefferson the additions which
he had, under the complainant's management, introduced into his
performance of the principal character. Whether Mr. Jefferson,
besides the written additions to it which have been mentioned,
introduced others which have never been written, relying, for
the repetition of them, on his memory alone, is involved in some
uncertainty. But if his additions were both written and unwritten,
they were all, according to the proofs, communicated by him to the
defendants and introduced by them into their performance of the
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play.
One of the complainant's interrogatories required the
defendants to state fully what language or words Mr. Clarke thus
obtained from Mr. Jefferson. Instead of making the statement
thus required, they merely offered in their answer to state "all and
singular the language or words" communicated if they should afterwards be required so to do. This offer does not entitle them to
derive any benefit from their omission to make the disclosure. But,
the complainant, not having excepted to the answer, cannot use
their omission to supply any defect in her own proof. Their offer
to make the statement shows, indeed, that nothing communicated
by Mr. Jefferson was thought so unimportant as to have been lost
by them for want of a memorial. That what he communicated to
them included any additions which had not been previously written
for the complainant, is improbable. But it may nevertheless be
true. If it be so, the written and unwritten additions must have
been combined in the production of dramatic effect. If the defendants can, in any view of the case, derive any benefit from an
assumption that some of them were unwritten, the assumption
should be made unless an inquiry by a master to ascertain the
precise truth be directed. Such an inquiry will be dispensed with
by assuming that some of the additions were unwritten. This
assumption will, however, be made so far only as it may benefit the
defendants. We will hereafter see that the decision will, upon this
view of the facts, be the same as if the additions were all written.
But under one head, the reasoning will not be the same.
The defendants, by thus obtaining the manuscript from Mrs.
Chapman, and the additions from Mr. Jefferson, having enabled
themselves to represent the play as it had been adapted and brought
out by the complainant, announced its intended performance on the
22d and 23d of November, 1858, in a playbill headed: "First
nights of the great new Comedy by Tom Taylor, author of ' Still
Waters Run Deep,' &c., entitled Our American Cousin, now in the
sixth week of its brilliant and triumphant career in New York. It
-will be presented after several weeks of most careful preparation."
It was performed according to this announcement, each of the
defendants acting a part in it, the defendant Clarke performing the
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Yankee character with Jefferson's adaptations. The defendants
performed the piece repeatedly afterwards, with profitable results.
Before their first performance of it, each of them, and the actress
of their company who performed the principal female character, had
witnessed the performance at the complainant's theatre. But they
were not enabled to represent it at their own theatre through any
impression of the words on their memory, or on that of any of the
audience who had attended the complainant's performances. The
proof is, on the contrary, distinct, that the words were obtained by
them from the manuscript procured from Mrs. Chapman, and
through the communication, by Mr. Jefferson, of the additions.
The above quotation from the defendant's playbill indicated that
their purpose was not an independent representation of the play so
much as a repetition of its performance at New York. Their effort
was to imitate this performance as closely as possible. That they
succeeded in producing a very close imitation appears from the
testimony. A person engaged at the complainant's theatre, in her
constant employment, who had very often seen the play performed
there, and says that he was familiar with it, was present at the
defendants' theatre on the first night of its performance in Philadelphia. Their playbill, already mentioned, containing a synopsis
of the scenery and incidents, under more than one hundred heads,
was before him. He deposes that he knew the play, word for word,
as the performance went on. According to his testimony, the
pirticular scene already mentioned, of which more than three-fifths
had been expunged by the complainant, was wholly omitted by the
defendants in their performance; but, except in this omission, the
performances at each theatre were the same, or similar. Two
particular instances, confirmatory of this evidence, may be regarded
as characteristic of the imitative purpose of the whole performance.
We have seen that, long after Mr. Silsbee left England, the arrangement of the play was changed by dividing it into three acts. The
manuscript which be took away must have been that of a play in
two acts. The defendants' playbill shows that they adopted the
change of arrangement by making the division into three acts; and
their cross-interrogatories for the commission to London indicate
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their vigilance in observing this, and a minuter nonconformity in the
texts of the manuscripts. The other instance was in one of the
adaptations at New York. The words "Pontiac, Michigan," had
been there struck out from the English manuscript, and "Brattlcboro', Vermont," substituted with a pencil. Where this first occurs
in the complainant's manuscript, the defendants' playbill, in
describing the scene, contains the words "Brattleboro', Vermont."
Thus, at each theatre, the play, as acted, was the English author's
composition adapted by the complainant, with Jefferson's additions,
and some curtailments and alterations, to the stage in the United
States. The defendants appear to have been careful to secure to
themselves, before performing it, the means of acting it, as a whole,
conformably to the method of its previous representation by the
complainant.
She instituted the present proceeding in November, 1858, alleging an exclusive right in herself under the above derivation of
title, and the statutes of the United States for the protection of
general and dramatic literary property, and praying an injunction
to restrain the defendants from representing the play, and an account of the profits, &c. When the piece was in the course of
successful performance at both theatres, an application for a preliminary injunction was heard upon affidavits and counter affidavits.
Upon a deposit by the defendants of a sum of money equal to the
amount for which the complainant had been willing to license its
performance by them, with a sufficient addition to cover costs, the
court refused to grant an injunction in the primary stage of the
cause.
It was afterwards heard upon bill, answer, and replication, depositions and papers read, and admissions.
The defendants, notwithstanding the public declaration in their
playbill that Mr. Taylor was the author of the comedy, asserted in
their ",nswer that it was of the joint authorship of himself and Mr.
Silsbee. Admitting that Mr. Taylor's right and interest were
transferred by him to Mr. Webster in 1852, they alleged that Webster, afterwards, for a valuable consideration, assigned it absolately
to Silsbee, who bequeathed his personal estate, in which it was
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included, to his widow, now Mrs. Chapman. They asserted that
her present husband, for a valuable consideration paid by them to
her, licensed its performance by them, and delivered to them the
manuscript, which they say was the original one. They have adduced no evidence of the alleged bequest, or subsequent license, or
of the payment of the alleged consideration. The assertion of
Webster's transfer to Silsbee is not only unsupported by proof, but
is directly contradicted by the testimony. The depositions of Mr.
Taylor and Mr. Webster, moreover, entirelynegative Silsbee's alleged
participation in the authorship; and show that the play was composed exclusively by Taylor, in whom, as we have seen, the proprietorship of it was revested in 1855.
One of the interrogatories of the complainant's bill required the
defendants to state fully, when, where, and how, they had obtained
possession of this comedy, and how they claimed the right of representing it. Any technical operation in their favor of their own
allegations responsive to this and other interrogatories of the bill is
removed by the contradictory testimony which has been reviewed.
Their answer, which has rendered this review necessary, is of no
technical force against such evidence; and not having been founded,
as to the most material points, upon any possible knowledge of their
own, is of no moral opposing force.
If Mrs. Chapman was the duly qualified representative of Mr.
Silsbee's estate, and, with her present husband, licensed the performance of the play by the defendants, the license was of no effect
whatever. Of this the defendants would seem to have been, at the
time of the hearing, fully aware. They did not attempt to verify
any writing as a manuscript, or copy of the manuscript, of the play,
or offer any such writing in evidence. They thus wholly failed in
their endeavor to show that they had rightfully represented the
play from the manuscript, or that any copy of it had ever been
rightfully in their possession.
The defence was confined, at the hearing, to a denial of the complainant's right of maintaining her suit under the acts of Congress
for the protection of literary property, or independently of those
acts.
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The consideration of the acts of Congress may be prefaced by
the remark that the word copyright, and phrase literary property,
though sometimes confounded, are not synonymous. The latter
phrase has a more general signification than copyright, which signifies an exclusive right of an author and his assigns to print his
literary composition, and publish and republish it in print. A
legislative enactment securing generally to literary proprietors a
copyright for a limited period, but containing no special provision
as to theatrical representation, does not, in the case of a dramatic
literary composition, include the sole right of such representation.
This, which the course of legislation on both sides of the Atlantic
implies, was decided in Coleman vs. Wathen, (5 D. & E. 245,) and
Murray vs. Elliston, (5 Barnw. & Ald. 657,) cited and remarked
upon in 12 Ad. & El., N. S. 236, and ,2 De G. & Sm. 675, 692.
In the absence of any legislation for the special protection of
dramatic literary property, an authorized public circulation of a
printed copy of a drama for which there is a legislative copyright is
a publication which legalizes an optional subsequent theatrical representation by any body from such copy. But the mere adoption
of the measures by which such a copyright may be secured has no
such effect unless their adoption has been attended or followed by an
actual publication in print.
The complainant had adopted the usual measures to secure to herself a statutory copyright for the United States. In so doing, she
had observed all the statutory regulations on the subject, except the
direction that a copy of the book be delivered to the clerk of the
proper court within three months from the time of its publication.
The intended meaning of the word publication, in this and other
statutory provisions concerning copyright, is publication in print.
The period, therefore, from which the three months would be computable, is not arrived. The complainant had thus observed every
direction which could be complied with in the case of an unprinted
book.
So far as any question under the Acts of Congress was concerned,
the citizenship of the parties in the cause was immaterial. The Act
of 15th of February, 1819, gives to the Circuit Courts original cog-
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nizance, as well in equity as at law, of all cases "arising under any
law of the United States, granting or confirming to authors or inventors the exclusive right to their respeetivc writings, inventions,
and discoveries." This act concerns remedies, and not rights. Under the statutes which confer and regulate rights of literary proprictorsbip, the citizenship of the parties litigant was also unimportant.
It sufficed, under these acts, that the complainant was a resident of
the United States, which was undisputed. The difficulty in her way
was, that Mr. Taylor, the author through whom her title was derived, was a non-resident alien. This difficulty presented the only
question under the Acts of Congress requiring particular consideration.
The Act of 3d of February, 1831, repealed, with a saving of privileges then existing, the prior statutes concerning rights of literary
property. The 9th section of this act, giving redress for the unauthorized printing or publishing of manuscripts, operates in favor
of a resident of the United States, who has acquired the proprietorship of an unprinted literary composition from a non-resident alien
author. But the word publish here again means publish in print.
This-which is the only section enabling a proprietor, who derives
his title from such an author, to assert any right under the act-gives no redress for an unauthorized theatrical representation. The
other sections concern copyright. They apply only to authors who,
if not citizens, must be residents of the United States, and proprietors under derivations of title from such authors. No other proprietor can obtain a copyright under the act.
The only statute which affords redress for unauthorized theatrical
representations, is the Act of 18th of August, 1856. This act applies only to cases in which copyright is effectually secured under
the Act of 1831.
Therefore, the complainant had no statutory right of redress.
The remaining inquiry was, whether her suit could be sustained,
independently of any legislation concerning dramatic or other literary property.
Under this head, as the defendants were citizens of Pennsylvania,
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the general equitable jurisdiction of the court could be exercised if
the complainant was a citizen of another state, or an alien.
At the commencement of the suit she was an alien, residing at
New York. But she had previously filed a declaration of her intention to become a citizen of the United States. During the pendency of the suit, and before the hearing, she was naturalized. She
was described, in her bill of complaint, as a citizen of the State of
New York. This description of her, though correct at the time of
the hearing, had not been correct when the bill was filed. She
should have been described in it as an alien. As the jurisdiction
of the court was maintainable under either description of her, if
true, the mistake was of such a character that an amendment correcting the misdescription would, of course, have been allowed,
whenever asked. The case was heard and considered as if such an
amendment had already been made.
The complainant insisted that, as the play had never been
printed, her literary proprietorship of it entitled her to maintain
the suit, independently of any statute.
The author's proprietary rights for England and Scotland had
never been transferred to her. The Statutes of the United States
for the protection of authors do not, like those for the benefit of inventors, expressly sanction transfers of limited local proprietorships
of exclusive privileges. A writing, which is, in form, a transfer by
an author of his exclusive right for a designated portion of the
United States, would, therefore, at law, even under the statutes of
copyright, operate as a mere license, and would be ineffectual as an
assignment. (10 How., 194; 1 Wall, Jr., 339; 17 Com. B., 436,
437.) Whether an assignment by a foreign author of his whole
right, for the entire United States, would fall within the same rule,
is a question which might be discussed, if such an author could acquire a copyright, or, by a transfer, impart the privilege of acquiring
one. (See 4 H. L. Ca., 992, 993, 940.) In the present case, where
the foreign author had no statutory proprietorship, and could impart no privilege of obtaining one, his transfer to the complainant
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cannot be regarded otherwise than as only a partial assignment,
upon which a suit could not be maintained at law in her own name.
But, in a proceeding like the present, in equity, a limited local, or
other partial assignment, if made, for a valuable consideration, by
a person whose transfer of the whole interest would have passed the
proprietorship, is carried into effect, whether it would have been effectual or not, at law. (3 Jur. 219; 11 Sim. 572; 5 Peters, 602;
3 Swanst. 393; 4 Mylne & Cr. 702, 703; 7 Sim. 109.) The complainant, therefore, does not, in this court, stand in any respect on
a less favored footing than an author. That her asserted literary
proprietorship is derived under one who was a non-resident alien
does affect her case, considered independently of the statutes.
Here, we may remark, that the literary proprietorship of the
principal composition included that of the additions to it which have
been described as written, in pencil, on the complainant's manuscript, and of such other additions as may have been made in
writing. These additions, as literary accessions, were incapable of
independent proprietorship. (ffatton vs. Kean, 29 L. Journ. N. S.
Com. Pls. 20; 7 Com. B. N. S; Pothier Propri6td, 170 to 175;
Code Nap. 566, 567; and see the citations of other modern European
Codes in Saint Joseph's Concordance.)
The rules of the law of accession, which have been thus applied,
are applicable in favor only of such innocent parties as have not
wilfully used the property of others. A wrongdoer can derive no
benefit from the otherwise accessorial character of that which he
converts to his own use. The publication of books may thus, for
literary piracy, be suppressed, when the pirated matter is accessorial
only to former compositions for which there could be no copyright,
and constitutes only a very small proportion of the whole contents.
Thus, as against a wrongdoer, that which is an accessorial part of a
whole, may be regarded as a material, or even vital, part. (3
Swanst. 680, 681; 5 Yes. 709, 16 Coin. B. 459; 3 Mylne & Co.,
738, 736, 737.) The distinction will hereafter be found important.
In whose handwriting the additions were, does not appear, and
is not material. That they were conceived and suggested, if not
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-written,by Mr. Jefferson when engaged in assisting the complainant
in bringing out the play, is indisputable. If their accessorial character could be excluded from consideration, his relation to her as his
employer would have rendered him incapable of acquiring in them
an independent proprietorship of his own. The duties of theatrical
performers to their employers are, in this respect, like those of
artists retained under a standing engagement in any other professional service. Where a female opera singer had engaged with a
theatrical proprietor to sing for three months at his theatre, and
not sing elsewhere during that period, without his consent, Lord St.
Leonards said: "The engagement to perform for three months at
one theatre, must necessarily exclude the right to perform at the
same time at another theatre. It was clearly intended that" she
"was to exert her vocal abilities to the utmost to aid the theatre to
which she engaged to attach herself." He was "of opinion that if
she had attempted, even in the absence of any such negative stipulation, to perform at another theatre, she would have broken the
spirit and true meaning of the contract as much as" in the case of
"the contract into which she" had "actually entered." (1 De G.
Macn. & G. 618, 619. See 6 De G. M. & G. 230.) A calico
printer discharged his head colorman, who sued him in trover for a
book of entries of processes of mixing the colors used in his
business. The book had been kept by the plaintiff while in the
defendant's employment. It contained entries of many processes
which were of the plaintiff's own invention. The decision was that
he could not recover. Heath, J., said that though there might be
inventions of the plaintiff in it, yet they were the property of the
master. Chambre, J., said that the master had a right to something
beside the mere manual labor of the servant in the mixing of the colors;
and though the plaintiff invented them, yet they were to be ubed
for his master's benefit. (4 Taunt. 770.) If it be suggested that
literary addition, or adaptation, is no part of the general duty of
dramatic performers, and that there is no particular exception in
the case of an unprinted play never before performed, the objection
may, in this case, be disposed of without considering the question
suggested. Here, Mr. Jefferson, while in the general theatrical
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employment of the complainant, engaged in the particular office of
assisting in the adaptation of this play; and made the additions in
question in the course of his willing performance of this duty. She
consequently became the proprietor of them as products of his
intellectual exertion in a particular service in her employment.
W here an inventor, in the course of his experimental essays, employs
an assistant who suggests, and adapts, a subordinate improvement,
it is, in law, an incident, or part, of the employer's main invention.
(1 Com. B. 551.) In a case of a musical composition, a person who
adapted words to an old air, and procured a friend to compose an
accompaniment, acquired a copyright, both in the words and the
accompaniment. (7 Com. B. 4.) The direct application of the
principle to literary compositions, their parts, additions, and accessions, is too familiar to require more than a reference to some of
the authorities. (2 L. Journ. Ch. 90, 2 S. & S. 1; 16 Com. B. 459;
3 Jur. 219; 5 Carr. & P. 58; Merlin Questions de Droit, "Contrefacon," § II., vol. 2, p. 659; "Proprigtd Literaire," § II., vol. 6,
p. 498, 4th ed., and iatton vs. Kean, cited above.)
Therefore, so far as the question of literary proprietorship, independently of the statutes, may be concerned, Mr. Jefferson's written
additions will require no separate or distinct consideration.
The play having never been printed, the complainant, as its
literary proprietor, could, independently of the statutes, have maintained her suit, if the defendants' theatrical representation of it had
not been preceded by her own. If the previous performance of it
at her theatre had been the means of enabling the defendants fairly
to bring it out at their theatre, the suit could not have been maintained. But the point for decision was, whether her prior performance, as it had not been the means through which they were enabled
so to do, defeated her suit.
Under the peculiar circumstances of the case, this point could, as
I thought, and still think, be decided independently of any question
In the administration of equitable
of literary proprietorship.
jurisprudence, improper disclosures of the knowledge of primary
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results of mental developement, whether the contents of literary
compositions, or oral discourses, or secrets of inventors, or improper
disclosures of knowledge acquired in professional relations, or in
those of service or agency, are prevented and redressed on principles
of general applicability. (3 Law Journ. Ch. 209, 213, 219; 1 Hall &
T. 28; 2DeG.&Sm.652; lHall&T.1; lMacn.&G.25; 7Pet.
317 to 322; 2 Bos. & Pul. 630, 577, 578; 2 Mees & W. 558 to
560; 2 Meriv. 450, 451; 1 Vern. 61; 3 Meriv. 157; 1 Jac. & W.
394; 1 Sim. & Stu. 398; 9 Hare, 241, 267; 21 L. Journ. ch. N.,
S. 248; 9 Eng. L. & Eq. 182; 9 Sim. 196; 10 Sim. 135; 15 Sim.
378; 1 Hall & T. 116; 2 Phillips, 777, 778.) In the exercise of
this equitable jurisdiction, rights founded in personal and professional relations of confidence are protected independently of any
question of the existence or continuance of proprietary right.
Preventive protection under this head is afforded in proceedings
against persons not themselves parties or immediate privies to the
bieach of confidence. A person who has not acquired through it
an independent subsisting equity of his own, is not permitted by
a Court of Equity to derive any benefit from it, or to retain any
benefit so derived.
In the present case, the complainant has acquired all such rights
in the principal composition as were formerly Webster's. The
defendants assert in it no right, except as derived under Silsbee.
The case, therefore, as to the copy of it which Silsbee had, is the
same as if Webster and Silsbee were now the litigants. The defendants have used this copy, though Silsbee had no possession of
it except for use in his professional service to Webster. They
procured Mr. Jefferson's additions through his breach of professional duty to the complainant as his employer. As to these additions, the direct breach of confidence was between Jefferson and
the complainant. But, according to many of the authorities which
have been cited, the defendants, having procured, or availed themselves of, Mr. Jefferson's violation of his duty to the complainant,
stand, in respect of it, in his place. We have seen that theatrical
performers, in the relation of Silsbee to Webster, or of Jefferson to
the complainant, owe to their employers no less fidelity than
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artists, or agents, retained in any other permanent, or temporary,
professional service.
Though the complainant's literary proprietorship of the play in
question had not been sustainable, she had the only manuscript
from which a first performance of it could be lawfully made. Having the advantage of this priority, she was known to be desirous of
retaining the exclusive dramatic representation of the piece. In
any competition with professional rivals, this priority, and the possession of the manuscript, gave to her a fair advantage, which,
without any literary proprietorship, might have been retained for
some time, if not indefinitely. In regulating the police of her
theatre, she could have prevented reporters from taking down the
words of the play'during its performance, and could have excluded
persons unwilling to acquiesce in such conditions. (Ambl. 694;
17 Cobb. Parl. Hist. 1094; 2 De G. & Sm. 692; 13 AI. & W.
838.) The only fair means by which others could have obtained
the words, were, through their impression upon the memory of
some person, whose constant attendance at her performances of the
play, might, at length, enable him, elsewhere, to repeat or to write
out its language. If, through such attendance of one or more persons, the words of unprinted plays could be obtained accurately,
the method of obtaining them would not be expeditious or economical. Its adoption has not, in modern experience, been usual.
The defendants, as the complainant's professional rivals, did not
compete fairly with her when they used any other means of abridging the duration of her legitimate advantages. This remark applies,
at all events, to the means which were, in fact, used.
The remark might, under proper pleadings, have been applicable
to the use both of the copy which Silsbee had retained, and the
additions which the defendants procured from Jefferson. The case
would then, upon the merits as disclosed by the answer and prioofs,
have been a simple one. But, the complainant's bill is not so
framed, that she can, independently of the question of literary proprietorship, obtain a decree founded upon the defendanuts' use of the
copy retained by Silsbee. The bill contains no averment of the
surreptitious, or other, former, or present, possession by any one
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of a copy of the manuscript, or of the use by the defendants of such
a copy. Except the averment that the defendants represented the
play publicly without the complainant's consent, and the interrogatory quoted above, the bill contains nothing on the subject. A
decree for a complainant cannot be made upon a fact not averred
in the bill, though it may be disclosed in the defendant's answers
to the interrogatories of the bill. (8 Swanst. 687, 689 ; 10 Wheat.
188; 1 Pet. C. C. 383, 884; 1 Gall. 385, 886; 3 Barb. Ch. 51.)
The, complainant, when this objection was taken, had an opportunity to amend her bill in this particular, but made no application
for the purpose. The only advantage to her, therefore, of the disclosures as to the copy retained by Silsbee, and the use made of it,
is in the proof which these disclosures afford that the defendants
were not enabled to represent the play merely from its having been
publicly performed at her theatre. Whether, on the footing of
literary proprietorship, this would suffice to sustain her suit, is not,
at this moment, the question. Independently of such proprietorship, her suit cannot, upon this bill, be sustained on the mere ground
of the improper use of this copy.
The complainant is, however, under no such difficulty as to the
improper use of the additions procured from Jefferson. Her bill
avers that the defendant Clarke obtained the principal parts and
the language from Jefferson, who was in her employment as an
actor, and who performed one of the characters in the comedy.
Though her claim of an exclusive right had not been sustainable,
she was entitled, in her competition with professional rivals, to the
co-operation and support of every person employed by her within
the walls of her theatre. The implied confidential restriction which
ought to have prevented the disclosure of the words of her new
play by performers of her own theatrical company, was of the
greatest importance to her in this competition. Yet, Mr. Jefferson
communicated his additions to Mr. Clarke, who introduced them
into his own performance. The unwritten additions, which may
have been included, could not be the subject of literary proprietorship. But, the equitable jurisdiction which we are now considering is exercisable on grounds which are independent of proprietary
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right in the party injured, or in any other person. The jurisdiction has been thus exercised in the cases of an oral didactic lecture,
and of an unpatentable or unpatented invention. (8 L. Journ. Oh.
209; 9 Hare, 241, 258, 259.) The doctrine in question applies,
therefore, alike to the unwritten and the written additions, whether
those in writing were the subject of literary proprietorship, or not.
If the success of the play is attributable, in any principal degree, to the additions, alterations, and curtailments, by which it
was adapted at New York to dramatic representation, the same
equitable doctrine applies to it as a whole, just as it was acted
there, including the former composition so far as retained, and
the additions, written and unwritten, if any of them were in truth
unwritten. This brings us to the inquiry, how far the additions, as
the particular subject of Mr. Jefferson's breach of his duty, should
be regarded as having had a principal, as distinguished from a subordinate and iniignificant influence, in causing the success of the
performance. If they cannot safely be rejected from' consideration
as trivial and insignificant, both in their character and in their
effect, the cause may be decided on the ground of breach of confidence, independently of the question of proprietary right.
With reference to this play, the defendants describe such "assistance and authorship" as their answer attributes to the late Mr.
Silsbee as "1invaluable." Their language, though, so far as this
play is concerned, misapplied as to him, tends to define the particular character of it as a drama. The language seems to have
been less inapplicable to Mr. Jefferson, of whom, as a member of
the complainant's company, the talent and experience were, or
should have been, at her command. Nevertheless, their answer in
certain passages has a tendency to disparage Mr. Jefferson's assistance to them, as though the additions or adaptations obtained
through it had been of trivial value. These passages of the answer
are, however, inconsistent with other statements in it, and are contradicted by the defendants' own conduct, in procuring and using
the adaptations. This conduct precludes them from denying, with
any fair show of reason or justice, that for the purpose of adapting
the play favorably to the stage, the additions, curtailments, and
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alterations were improvements at least upon the author's composition. That they probably diminished some difficulties which had
prevented the play from being acted in England, and removed objectionable features which, for local reasons, would have prevented
the success of it in the United States, is perhaps not stating the
case in its full strength. As the play was performed, the success of
it, as a whole, was complete. But from what occurred in England
and in this country, we may infer that its performance without the
adaptations might have resulted in a failure. The author's manu.
script had, in England, been cast aside for six years. In all this
time, the copy which Mr. Silsbee had retained was unthought of
and useless. The defendants having this copy in their possession,
with no scruples as to using it, had not been willing to act the play
from it, without the New York adaptations. The plot was not
theatrically novel. The success of the piece was dependent upon
the scenery and incidents, and the vivacity and humor of the dialogue. Mr. Hallam, following a suggestion of Collier, thinks that,
in modern theatres, the use made of scenery has diminished, in
certain cases, the necessity for exercising the creative powers of a
dramatic author's imagination. Such may be the case peculiarly
with a light piece of this class. The synopsis of scenery and incidents in the play-bill shows that this was, in the opinion of those
who brought it out, not less impoitant than the dialogue. To these
arrangements, however, the dialogue required adaptation. Some
of the additions in pencil to the author's manuscript indicate a
self-confident, but not imprudent, boldness, which probably was the
result of a combination, in Mr. Jefferson, of histrionic talent with a
matdred experience in the production of comic effect. We, however, cannot estimate their importance or value from anything so
surely as from the conduct of the parties and the success of the
play. Schlegel asks, "How does a dramatic work become theatrical
or fitted for the stage?" and answers, " In single instances it is
often very difficult to determine whether a work possesses such a
property or not. It is, indeed, frequently the subject of great controversy, especially when the self-love of authors and actors comes
into collision. Each shifts the blame of failure on the other." He
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says of "theatrical fitness," that much must "always depend on
the capacities and humors of the audience, and, consequently, on the
national character in general, and the particular degree of mental
culture." In a certain line of the dramatic profession, a particular
actor, or stage manager, or assistant, may be endowed with a peculiar faculty for the adaptation of a piece to such humors and capacities. For a drama like that in question, Jefferson may have possessed this faculty. Whether the defendants could, without his
assistance, have been able to bring out the piece at their theatre
with any probability of success, is thus an inquiry which cannot be
safely prosecuted with a view to an absolute answer. That they
availed themselves of his aid suffices to convince us that they could
not have otherwise brought it out with an equal prospect of success.
Here the question is not so much what number of words he communicated, or what the words were, or what was their character,as what
effect they produced. The purpose of the defendants is, moreover,
to be regarded. We have seen that it would not have be~n attained
by a partial or incomplete imitation of the play as it had been successfully brought out by the complainant. Their purpose was to
bring out at their theatre a complete imitation of it as a whole. By
taking advantage of the breach of confidence committed by Mr.
Jefferson, they enabled themselves to effect this purpose. His additions were, therefore, so far as the defendants were concerned, not
a secondary, but an essential, part of the play as performed.
But, according to the defendant's answer, these additions were
principally gags and minutim of stage effect, most of them old and
well known to the dramatic profession, and a very small proportion
of them original. The language of the answer imports that they were
not wholly of the character thus described. The defendants' counsel,
relying, however, upon the general tendency of its language, has
urged that the effect of such adaptations and additions, in promoting
the success of the play, must have been insignificant. There is no
safe, legal, or equitable standard by which effects of wrongful acts,
can, in general, be thus qualified or apportioned for the benefit, or
exemption, of parties or privies to their commission. The foregoing
reasoning has, in favor of the defendants, already, perhaps, too much
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relaxed the salutary rigor of the rule which, in general, prevents
wrong-doers from succeeding in attempts to apportion, for their own
benefit, the unknown consequences of such acts. The result of this
case would not be varied if we could safely assume, as, however, we
cannot, that the additions consisted principally in mere adaptations
of gags which, as formerly applied in other plays, were already fa.
imiliar to persons of experience in the dramatic profession.
A gag, in dramatic language, is a word, a sentence, or a passage
of two or more sentences, not in a drama as composed by the author,
but interpolated, and uttered on the stage by a player. Gags, in
general, are violations of dramatic propriety. But, theatrical regulations which prohibit them are not always enforced with strictness,
and are sometimes much relaxed as to comedians in public favor.
Sometimes gags are sanctioned by the manager's approval at the
rehearsal of a play. They are, occasionally, in comedies of the
lighter kind, licensed more or less, if not encouraged, by dramatic
authors, who attend rehearsals of their own plays. In England, as
the testimony proves, these authors, after the characters have been
cast, frequently, before any rehearsal, read their plays, in the
manager's presence, to the company of performers. On these occasions, or at rehearsals, gags may be sanctioned by both author and
manager. Sheridan, when he was author and manager, probably
sanctioned some of the gags with which one of his most popular
pieces has, to this day, been usually performed. In the play now
in question, where the first scene closes on the characters gathered
around the Yankee in England, who asks whether they will have "a
cobler, or a julep, a gin-sling, a cock-tail, or chain lightning ?" the
author, in his manuscript, adds, "winds up, with a catalogue ad libitum of the names and merits of American drinks." To exclude
gags fastidiously from other parts of such a play as this would oppose the apparent tendency of the author's own plan of its representation. A strict adherence to his written dialogue would, probably,
therefore, in many of the scenes, have been, even in his opinion, less
useful than some of Mr. Jefferson's additions. The judicious introduction by a comedian of his "tact and talent" of gags happily
adapted for the production or improvement of stage effect, may
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have prevented the failure, or greatly promoted the success of the
play.
The defendants' remark that the gags "were mostly old, and well
known to the" dramatic "profession," if it had been made with any
specified application, and had been verified by proof, would have been
of no importance. The judicious introduction of matter whose chief
or only novelty consists in its happy adaptationto the production
of stage effect, may contribute more to that popularity of a light
comedy, which secures profitable repetitions of its performance, than
polished wit, refined humor, or classical or courtly sarcasm. Literary
adaptation is legally recognized as a distinct branch of the dramatic
author's profession. It varies in degree from that aid which is the
mere accessory of another's work to that production which constitutes absolute authorship. (17 Com., B. 427; 7 Com., B. N. S.; 29
L. Journ., N. S. Com. Pls. 20.) The success or failure of a play
may depend upon that which is only accessorial, or upon dramatic
adaptation which is not even literary. Modifications of assistance
to dramatic effect may be various, almost infinitely so. Most important aid may sometimes be furnished by the repetition, with a
new application, of that which has, under other theatrical circumstances, been said or done before. The extent or value of the benefit
which may be derivable from such adaptations cannot always be
measured very precisely, for practical purposes, by any standard of
mere literary criticism.
In the case of a drama which has been printed and published, the
subsequent approval of a gag by the manager of the only theatre at
which the drama has been represented, and the sanction or adoption
of the same gag by the author, will not render it, as a legal accession,
a part of his dramatic literary composition, though it'has been, with
his concurrence, inserted in writing in the manuscript from which the
drama was, before such insertion, printed. Much less can ordinary
gags, not thus inscribed or sanctioned, become accessions to the
composition. If unwritten gags could be a subject of proprietary
right, as they never can be, they would, as between the dramatic
author and the player uttering them, be the player's. As between
such a player and the manager or proprietor of the theatre at which
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he is engaged, if the drama has already been published in print, or,
though unprinted, has been so represented on different stages that
there is no theatrical rivalry, or competition for its exclusive performance, the friendly communication of the gags by the player to
members of his profession engaged at other theatres, would not, in
ordinary cases, violate any confidence resulting from his implied
conventional relations to his own employer. The defendants, in their
answer, say, that among players interchanges of such professional
courtesies are usual. They may not be improper in such ordinary
cases. But this *Was, in every respect, a different case.
I was, therefore, of opinion that the means used by the defendants to enable themselves to imitate the complainant's performance
of the play had been such as to entitle her to a decree, independently of the question of her literary proprietorship, on which I
avoided the expression of an opinion.
If the defendants, in taking advantage of Mr. Jefferson's breach
of duty to his employer, had been innocent parties, not aware of his
confidential relation to the complainant, the jurisdiction of the court,
so far as exercisable independently of her literary proprietorship,
would have been preventive only. As, however, they were privies
to and participants in his breach of confidence, if not the procurers of it, they were liable to make her pecuniary compensation.
But, though the jurisdiction bad been merely preventive, the fund
in court would, in this case, have been answerable for the complainant's indemnity. Her application for a preliminary injunction was
refused upon the deposite of this money to secure to her an indemnity if the defendants' continued performance of the play should be
adjudged a violation of any right entitling her to an injunction.
The defendants having continued its performance, this fund is
answerable for all damages, not exceeding its amount, sustained by
her from such continuance. Out of the fund, she is thus entitled
to pecuniary relief, independently of any question of the defendants'
privity to the breach of confidence, and independently of any question of her own literary proprietorship.
The amount of this fund was fixed with reference to that which
the complainant, before suit, had asked as the price of a license

LkURA. KEENE vs. WHEATLEY & CLARKE.

authorizing an exclusive or unrestricted representation of the play by
the defendants in Philadelphia. When this price was asked by her
she asserted a claim of statutory copyright. This claim is not
maintainable. Had she known then that her literary proprietorship was precarious from its dependence upon effects of publication,
she probably would have been willing to grant such a license for a
lower price. She named the price, not as the consideration of a
proposed compromise, but as her own estimate of the value of the
license which a secure copyright would have enabled her to give.
There is, consequently, no probability that she will eventually recover an amount which, with the addition of costs, will equal the
sum in deposite. It is true that, as her offer was not accepted, she
is not precluded from proving, if she can, that a license from her
would have been worth more than she asked for it, or that she has
in some other mode sustained loss to a greater amount. Her counsel say that the success of the play has been much greater than was
expected when she named this price, and urge that the extraordinary excess of profit should neutralize the effect of her proposal.
Proof of the actual profits might, for this purpose, be proper for the
consideration of a jury. But such proofs might be of little a-Vail
against the effect of her own estimate of the value of a license.
The court, in announcing the foregoing views, added that an issue
to determine the amount of the complainant's damages would be
ordered, if asked by either party, and that, if neither party asked
it, the case would be referred to a master to report the proper
amount of her compensation. The court strongly recommended a
settlement of the controversy.
The cause formally stood over for the amendment in the description of the citizenship of the complainant. This amendment was
not made until July, 1860. When it was made, the defendants filed
an addition to their former answer, and also filed a plea. The addition to the answer was not of such a character that it could regularly have been filed in so late a stage of the cause; and it was not
relevant, in anywise, to the amendment of the complainant's bill.
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But, upon a special reason, suggested by the counsel of the defendants, they were allowed to make the addition as an amendment of
their former answer.
The plea which they filed alleged that the complainant was, when
the suit was instituted, the wife of a person of a given surname,
whose christian name was not given. He was described as now in
Australia; but his calling or business was not specified, nor was his
identity in any other manner determined. There was no allegation
that her asserted marriage was a newly-discoverel fact. On the
contrary, the defendants, in the course of examination of a witness,
had, more than a year previously, made strenuous efforts to prove
that she was married to a person of the surname given in this plea.
Their counsel, however, insisted that, as the complainant had
amended her bill, they were not only entitled to answer anew, but
were, under the 39th rule of equity practice, entitled also to plead,
notwithstanding their former answer and present additional answer.
An amendment of a complainant's bill, except so far as it may
introduce a new or different case, has not the effect of opening the
pleadings in an equity suit. The court looks back through the
pleadings, to ascertain whether, and how far, the amendment may
have introduced such a case. So far as it may have been introduced, the defendant may demur, plead, or answer anew. Unless a
new case is presented by the amended bill, a defendant's former
answer to the original bill overrules any plea which he may interpose after the amendment. The 37th and 39th rules do not apply
so as to introduce a contrary practice in this respect. Their pur.
pose cannot have been to permit a defendant,'in such a case, to introduce, in a late stage of the cause, matter which might have been
insisted on by way of plea when the former answer was filed. If
this were, in general, otherwise, matters of abatement and objections to the character of the parties are expressly excepted from
the operation of the 39th rule, which is, therefore, inapplicable to
this plea. For these reasons, and because the plea wanted the requisite specification, and omitted certain usual averments, and was
not properly verified, the complainant's counsel moved that it should
be taken off the file. The court permitted the complainant, without
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prejudice to this motion, to set the plea down for a hearing.
then, upon argument overruled.

It was

In the interval which had preceded this final adjustment of the
pleadings, I had considered the question of the complainant's literary
proprietorship, as it had been asserted independently of the copyright laws. The case not having been settled by agreement, and
an issue appearing to be necessary, the continued forbearance to
express an opinion upon this point seemed improper, as its expression might perhaps have some influence in determining the pecuniary result of the issue. In stating my views of the question, the
order in which the subject has been investigated privately for
purposes of self-instruction will be pursued.
is a certain or contingent exclusive right of unlimi.Proprietorship
ted or limited profitable use of an ascertainable subject, corporeal or
incorporeal. Proprietorship, thus defined, is compounded of the proprietor's beneficial rights, and his right of excluding other persons from the use or profit. Any such use, as may be of actual
or possible advantage or convenience to himself, or any other person, is profitable. When the proprietor's right of excluding others
from such use, or from the profit of it, is unlimited, as to persons
and purpose, the proprietorship is absolute. When the right of
exclusion is limited, either as to persons or as to purpose, the proprietorship is qualified. It is ended when the right of exclusion
ceases wholly. The question is, how far the property called literary
is within the general doctrines of the law of proprietorship. Though
not an anomalous it is a peculiar subject of these doctrines.
A LITERARY COMPOSITION is an originalresult of mental production, developed in a series of written or printed words, arranged
for an intelligible purpose in an orderly succession of expressive
combinations. The person by whom the composition is primarily
thus developed is its author. An author and his assigns are included in the meaning of the general phrase, literary proprietor.
The uses of the composition consist in, or depend upon, actual or
potential communication of the knowledge of the contents.
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The communication of such knowledge may be confidential. It is
of this character whenever conventional or other personalrelations of
the receiver to the maker preclude any rightful ulterior communication of the knowledge acquired. The simplest example, where the
relation is conventional, occurs in the case of a loan by a literary
proprietor of a book, of which the contents are unknown to others.
(See 4 H. L. Ca. 919, 920.) This is a bailment of it, to be read
by the borrower, who receives it under an implied confidence, precluding his use of it for any other purpose. (2 Ld. Ray, 915.)
More extended and complicated cases of implied confidence,
where the breach of it has been redressed or prevented in the course
of the administration of equitable jurisprudence, have been mentioned under a former head. Other examples will hereafter be
mentioned incidentally.
Lord Mansfield and Willes, J., in 1769, (4 Burr. 2398, 2399,
2395, 2396, 2312,) and Aston, J., in 1774, (17 Cobb. Parl. Hist.
980,) were of opinion that, even in the absence of confidential relations, rules of decision on questions of literary proprietorship
might be deduced from principles of "private justice, moral fitness,
and public convenience." But Lord Eldon discarded this doctrine.
(3 L. Journ. Ch. 209.) It has been criticized and condemned by De
Grey, C. J., (17 Cobb. P. H. 990 ;) Lord Camden, (lb. 998;) Pollock,
C. B., (4 H.L. Ca. 935,936;) and Lord Brougham, (Ib. 968.) Some of
these judges conceded that what was manifestly against the public
interest might, for that reason, be rejected from the law. But
they all concurred that those who administer jurisprudence cannot
on this, or any other subject, create and define rights merely because, in their opinion, such rights ought, according to justice, propriety, and convenience, to exist. Rules of decision on the subject
of literary property must, therefore, be sought in doctrines of the
common law, or must be traced in principles from which its rules
may appear to have been derived.
The present subject of consideration is literary proprietorship
alone, regarded as independent of any question of confidential
relations.
The ordinary definition of literaryproperty,as the exclusive right
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of the proprietor to multiply copies of the composition, is, for general
purposes, too narrow, because, where the proprietorship exists, the
circulation of copies is not the only specific method in which the
subject may be profitably used. The definition is thus too narrow
for the specific purposes of the present case, where the question to
be decided arises from the use of a literary composition in another
mode-that of theatrical representation. Literary property may
be described as the right which entitles an author and his assigns
to all the use and profit of his composition to which no independent
right is, through any act or omission on his or their part, vested
in another person.
This definition, or description, cannot be applied without a specification of the profitable uses of a literary composition. Their
specification includes all such methods of communicating a knowledge of the contents as are not exclusively confidential.
Such communications are effected by reciting or audibly reading
the composition, or by circulating it. The recitation, or lecture,
or circulation, may be private or public.
A recitation or lecture before a select audience is private, and
before an indiscriminateaudience, public. This distinction determines the difference between private and public theatricalrepresentation. Such a representation of a dramatic literary composition
includes its recital.
A circulationis an act by which a literary proprietor parts with
possession of the original manuscript, or a written or printed copy,
for any purpose not exclusively confidential. The original manuscript, however, is very seldom circulated. The distinction between
the private andpubliccirculation of copies is differently determined,
as they are manuscript or printed.
Writing is a method of originally developing the composition,
and of adding copies made singly, letter by letter. Printingis a
process of multiplying the copies, by sheets.
Thus the difference is that between multiplication and addition.
Human means of increasing the number of copies by writing are
extremely limited. By printing, they may, on the contrary, in
the words of Lord Cranworth, be multiplicd indefinitely. (4 11 L.
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833.) The books printed by those who first publicly practised the
typographic art in Europe usually contained an advertisement that
they were not written, as all books had previously been; but were
made by a new invention, whereby the several sheets were stamped
at once, and not made line by line as formerly. (See Dibd. Typ.
Antiq. I. 20.) Judge McLean has truly said, that manuscripts, in
modern times, cannot be of general use. (4 McL. 304.) In 1519,
as we learn from a book published in that year in England, printing had already almost ruined the business of the scribes. (Dibd.
ii. 480.) In 1693, it wasjudicially said, that "in primitive times,
before printing was invented, writing was found to be an overt act,
and made high treason; therefore, printing was, more manifestly,
an overt act." (12 How. St. Tr. 1248.) In literature, and in law,
every manuscript copy requires a separate authentication; and no
such copy can be so authenticated as to become the substitute for
an accessible original. But, for purposes of circulation, the manuscript from which an authorized edition is printed, has discharged
its office when the copies are struck off; and every copy of the
impression is, for such purposes, an authentic counterpart of the
others. The printed copies have been judicially designated as all
originals. (32 How. St. Tr. 82 to 86, 2 Stark. Rep. 130, 114.)
Legal as well as practical differences have thus resulted from the
disuse of writing and substitution of printing, as the ordinary
method of making copies for general circulation. The judicial
recognition of these modern differences has not been attended with
any disregard of the rules of ancient jusisprudence. But the practical application of these rules has been modified in adapting them
to the change of usage.
The circulation of written will be considered before that of
printed copies.
The distinction between a public circulation of written copies,
and a restricted or private communication of their contents, was,
for some purposes, recognized before the use of printing. (Wilkins
Cone. iii. 317, A. D. 1408-9 ; Middleton's Dissert, note (u,) A. D.
1410; also in Ames' Typ. Ant. 64; Herbert, 86; and Dibd. i. 321.1)
1Dibdin's translation, in substituting a plural for a singular, goes beyond the warrant of the Latin text.
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But, except under special and unusual circumstances, an author
who then parted with a manuscript copy gave to it the most public
circulation of which it was capable. Now, the parting by an author
with manuscript copies of his unprinted composition, is ordinarily
regarded as an act of mere private circulation. (2 Atk. 342, 343;
Ambl. 787; 2 Swanst. 414; 2 Story, 109 to 112; 4 Duer, 379; 2
Eden, 829 ; 8 Pet. 657, 661 ; 14 How. 530, 531 ; 17 How. 451,
453; 4 McL. 800; 2 Barn and Ald. 298; 2 De G. and Sm. 652,
691; 1 Hall and T. 21; 1 Macn. and G. 42.) Under the laws concerning patents for inventions, a previous description of the alleged
invention in a "public work," which means a printed book, defeats
a patent. But, such a description in an unprinted book has, in
itself, no such effect. This distinction would, in like manner, determine the novelty of an invention, if those laws had contained
no express enactment on the subject. (Seethe note to Webster Pat.,
C. 718, 719; 9 M. and W. 302; 15 How. 110.) We have seen that
in the copyright laws, likewise, the word publish means publish in
print.
-Printedcopies also may be circulated privately. Their circulation is thus private when they are delivered to a few ascertained
persons only, who receive them under conditions expressly or impliedly precluding any ulterior diffusion of the knowledge of their
contents. Such a case occurs when a small first edition of a book,
printed with a notice on the title page that it is for private circulation, is gratuitously distributed by the author among particular persons. Mr. Justice Talfourd, when at the bar, issued, in this manner,
the first impressions of his tragedy of Ion. Here the restriction
was expressly defined. It may, in other cases, be implied from the
selection of the persons, and from the method or attendant circumstances of the delivery. (2 De G. and Sm. 652; 1 Hall and T. 1;
1 Macn. and G. 25; 4 H. L. Ca. 833, 919, 920.) The circulation
must be restricted both as to persons and purpose, or it cannot be
called private. The reasons that require this twofold restriction
will be stated hereafter, under another head. In the meantime,
we may observe that the case of a small first edition of a book,
printed by subscription, where the subscribers take all the copies,
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is not a case of private circulation. Here the persons are, it is
true, ascertained. But, the use to be made by them of the copies
is not expressly or impliedly restricted.
Any authorized act, such, for example, as a sale, which unrestrictedly sends forth a printed copy-in short, any act of circulation which is not within the above definition of a private one-is a
public circulation. Thus, in the case of a book printed by subscription, the delivery of a single copy to a subscriber is a public
circulation.
Cases for the application of the distinction between the private
and public circulation of Printed books rarely occur. The distinction might, however, under the above-mentioned provision of
the patent law, be attended with an important difference.
The uses of a literary composition have thus been described, not
according to their effects, but with reference to their specific
methwds. The consideration of their effects and consequences will
be postponed, in order that the legal nature of the composition,
the legal source of literary proprietorship, and the objections to
its existence and continuance may be previously considered.
A literary composition is of an abstractly incorporeal nature.
Its existence is independent of that of any material on which it
may have been produced, or copies of it may have been inscribed
or imprinted. (14 How. 451to 453; 2 De G. & Sm. 716; 4 H. L.
Ca. 833.) The incorporeal contents of the original sheets, and of
all written or printed copies, are thus one and the same composition. An invention or discovery in art or science may also have
an incorporeal existence independent of that of its embodiments.
For this reason, ande others not here pertinent, exclusive rights
of literary proprietors and inventors, even when secured by legislation, depend for their existence, continuance, and enforcement
upon reasons peculiarly metaphysical. (2 Sto. RIep. 291 ; 1 Mason, 472 ; 2 Blatchf. 246.) The most cautious language of
judges concerning such rights is liable, sometimes, to the danger
of being found pusceptiblo of D less unqualified application than
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was intended. (1 Sto. Rep. 288, 291; see 11 How. 606.) In
cases not legislatively provided for, this danger cannot be less
great.
Inventions, literary compositions, and other primary results of
mental development are incapable of any profitable use, independent of actual or potential communication of the knowledge of
the results. Actual communications of the knowledge are irrevocable. The original possessor of the knowledge cannot afterwards, by any physical or other process of resumption, deprive
others of it, or by any physical means prevent its ulterior communication, or suppress any such diffusion of its fruits as can be
directly or secondarily effected through any means which he has
once placed at the command of another person.
This physical irresumableness of the knowledge of a primary
result of mental development, and the shifting possession, and
indefinite number of the embodiments of the results, are incidents
distinguishing it, as a subject of asserted proprietorship, from such
an easement, or other privilege, as, though incorporeal, is exercisable in a fixed corporeal subject. Over such a subject, the
proprietor who, in granting the privilege, imposes conditions on
its exercise, may have a physical control. (4 H. L. Ca. 964.)
The embodiments of literary compositions and inventions, though
of indefinite number, and uncertain possession, are, nevertheless,
lastingmemorials of the results of the mental processes by which
they have been developed. In this respect, they differ from primary results of mental processes whose development is purely
intellectual, such as oral discourses. An oral discourse, though
studiously prepared and committed to memory, depends for its
retention or communication upon a fugitive or evanescent mental
impression. Such a result of mental development may be the
subject of conventional engagements, express or implied, or of confidential relations, imposing duties cognizable in a court of equity.
But it cannot be the subject of proprietary right. (3 L. Journ.
Ch. 209, imperfectly reported on this point, in 1 Hall & T. 28,
33, 35, 38, 39.) The case of a literary composition is different.
The existence of the author's manuscript, or of a single true copy,
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suffices to give a durable existence to the literary composition inscribed upon it. (3 L. Journ. Ch. 209; 2 Atk. 342; Ambl. 737 ;
2 Eden, 329; 2 Swanst. 402; 4 Duer 379, 382, 385; 1 Sto. Rep.
100; 14 How. 530, 531; 2 De G. & Sm. 691, 692, 673; 1 Hall
& T. 21 to 23.) Before the art of printing was known, manuscript memorials of results of intellectual development of unquestioned authorship had been preserved for thousands of years. The
typographic art now secures them against even a liability to oblivion until the desire for their perusal ceases. This exemption of
printed books from liability to be forgotten through the mere want
of copies was one of the consequential advantages of printing
proclaimed by those who first practised the art. The verse of
Milton and the prose of Newton have been since judicially
designated as immortal. (17 Cobb; Parl. Hist. 1000; 4 H. L.
Ca. 964.)
The memorials of results of invention may be not less enduring,
either through their actual embodiment, or their literary description. But a difference of practical importance distinguishes a
literary composition from an invention.
The memorials, however lasting, of an invention or discovery,
do not contain any such intrinsic tests of novelty and authorship,
as are peculiar and inherent in every literary composition. The
novelty and authorship of an invention require extrinsic verification. Unless they are attested by an act of State, the invention is
not a subject of proprietary right, though, like an oral discourse,
it may be the subject of an equitable binding confidence, or of
conventional obligation, express or implied. A literary composition is, on the contrary, always the distinguishable result of its
author's own mental development.
On this point of distinguishableness,the last observation might
have been prefaced by the remark that such a composition, as a
more or less complex result of successive mental processes, differs
from a mere simple result of a mental process or mental processes.
Any composition, large or small, which includes results of successive mental processes, rationally combined, whether it fill a great
volume, or be contained in a single small sheet, is within the legal
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denomination of a book. (2 Barn. and Ald. 800; Cowp. 623; 11
East, 244; 2 Oampb. 25, 27; 2 Paine, 382.) But statements,
propositions, or sentences, having no connection, or mutual dependence, would not, by being written or printed in motiveless juxtaposition, be brought within the definitiQn of a book or literary
composition. Much less would an isolated statement, proposition,
or sentence, though written, be within the definition, as it has been
understood for thousands of years. (See 2 Wall. Jr. 565; 2 Campb.
26, 27, 28, 30, 32.) Upon this difference, which has, more than
the others, been overlooked, the distinguishablenessof the composition, as the result of its author's mental creative labor, depends
Results of such productive labor, when developed beyond their
simplest elements, cannot be new without being original. A simple thought or statement may, perhaps, through an accidental
coincidence, be expressed originally by each of two persons, in
a single brief sentence composed of the same words arranged in
the same precise order. Such a coincidence, however improbable,
cannot be regarded as quite impossible. The possibility of its
occurrence in a translation, or in a scientific literary production, is
undeniable. But, a prolonged series of thoughts or statements,
bach one in itself simple, cannot have been expressed originally
by two persons in the same words arranged in the same succession.
In language of the mathematician, such a coincidence is infinitely
improbable. It has, from experience, been long recognized as
absolutely impossible. Practically, this impossibility has been
tested and ascertained in the case of even such a book as a directory. (12 Ves. 270; 16 Ves. 269; see 2 Sto. Rep. 793; 2 Russ.
385.) Its authorship is traced through its distinctive peculiarities
or occasional mistakes. If it is not capable, in any mode, of identification as the production of an author who is, or may be, known,
it is not a literary composition.
Such a composition is, therefore, always an ascertainablesubject
of any legal proprietorship of which it may be capable.
The legal source of the proprietary right of authorship, of which
the subject has thus been described, is that species of occupancy
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called productionas distinguished from invention. To the products
of our mental creative labor, we have, as it were, given their existence, ut in rerum natura essentfecimus. (ff 41. 2. 3. § 21 ; Grotius, de Jur. Bel. et P. 2. 3. 3, 2 BI. Com. 405; 2 Wall. Jr., 564;
2 De G. & Sm. 695; 411. L. Ca. 867; Merlin Repert. Tit. Contrefa~on.)
Blackstone refers to classical authorities which show that, in
some cases, the dramatic authors of ancient Rome sold their original
manuscripts, or first copies of them, to persons desirous of performing them at the theatre. (Cor. ii. 407.) The passages which
he cites prove that the prices received exceeded greatly those
paid for subsequent copies. A theatrical audience at Rome, accusing a dramatic author of what we now designate as a literary
piracy, called him a thief. The subject of the charge was a translation from the Greek of a play, of which a previous translation
had, without his knowledge, been already represented at Rome. In
justifying himself he drew the line of distinction between translation and plagiarism; and showed that where two successive translations were independently made, the second was not a piracy.
But, except in cases of compositions written for public recitation,
ancient authors cannot have had any reason for desiring to monopolize or control the circulation of their literary productions. The
danger already mentioned of their being lost in oblivion might not
be averted by the circulation of the greatest number of copies that
other persons might be willing to make. From the difficulty and
the delay in making them, and their great cost, this danger was
always impending until the introduction oif typography. Until
after this period, the doctrine of literary proprietorship cannot
have been developed. Its germ is, however, discoverable, perhaps, in the jurisprudence of ancient Rome. In the case of an
artist who painted a picture by mistake upon a tablet not his own,
supposing it his own, the question whether the picture belonged to
him or to the owner of the tablet, was discussed by lawyers in
Rome. The prevalent opinion was that the artist should have his
picture on paying the tablet's value to its former owner. It was
thought absurd that the proprietorship of a work of art should be
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dependent upon that of a thing of so little account as the tablet.
(Inst. 2, 1, de rer. div. § 34, ff 6, 1; de rei vind. 23, § 8 ; 41. 1 de
adq. rer. dom. 9, § 2; Caii Inst. 2, 1, de rebus, § 6.) Sir J. L. Knight
Bruce reasoned similarly, in a late case, where unauthorized impressions had been made from copperplates, remarking upon the
substantial worthlessness of the material except for that in which
its former owner had no property, and comparing the case with an
unauthorized circulation of a literary composition. (2 De G. & Sm.
716, 691 to 696.) We read, however, in several passages of the
Roman law, that the rule applied, as above, in the case of a picture, was not applicable in the case of a writing. According to
these texts, though the writing were in letters of silver or gold, its
ownership followed that of the substance on which it was contained, so that if a person inscribed a poem, history, or oration
upon the material of another man, it became the latter's property.
He could reclaim it, but was obliged to pay to the scribe, who had
used it innocently, a compensation for the writing. (ff 6, 1, de
rei Vind, ubi supra, 41, 1 de adq. rer. dom. 9, § 1; Inst. 2, 1, de
rer. div. § 83; Oaii Inst. ub. sup.) Thus, in the language of a
commentator, an original painting was regarded as of greater
account than the mere copy of a literary composition (pictura
literarum.) But, as the law of accession was understood in the
modern jurisprudence of continental Europe, the rule was different;
and the writing belonged, in such a case, to the scribe, who, on paying the value of the paper to its owner, was entitled to keep the
the copy. (Cujas on Inst. 2, 1, 33, 34; Pothier Propridtd, § 173;
Code Nap. Art. 568.) Some of the texts of the old Roman law
which have been cited may be read as applicable not only to the
writing of a copyist, but also to an original composition written,
through mistake, by its author, upon the material of another
person. But others of the texts do not admit of this interpretation; and perhaps none of them absolutely require it. If the
meaning of any of them was that the decision as to a painter's
original picture and an author's original manuscript should not be
the same, the reason for the rejection of their authority by modern
civilians was the stronger. Pothier designates the opinion that the
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ownership of the paper should carry with it that of the composition
as ridiculous. Lord Cranworth, in remarking upon a picture and
an engraving as the subjects of a claim of proprietary right, recently said that the difference between them was in the method in
which copies of an engraving could be multiplied. He said that a
picture was analogous to a manuscript, and that an engraving was
the same as a book. (4 H. L. Ca. 833.)
If the measure of proprietary dominion were dependent upon the
source alone of proprietorship, that of an author and his assigns,
thus deduced from his creative labor, would be capable of existing
to an unlimited extent. The enjoyment of subjects of originalproprietary right is less dependent than that of derivative acquisitions
upon conditional regulations, imposed from reasons of policy. Under the head of occupancy, the specific proprietary right of invention may, indeed, as in the case of treasure found in the earth, or
things found afloat on the sea, depend upon, or be modified by, considerations founded on such reasons. (Bracton, 120.) But no such
considerations restrict a producer's right of dominion over the fruits
of his own labor. Willes, J., nevertheless, was of opinion, that if
a literary proprietor had, independently of legislation, a perpetual
exclusive right of printing his composition and circulating printed
copies, his exercise of the exclusive right might be regulated by implied conditions, requiring him to supply the fair demand for his
book by keeping always in the market a sufficient number of copies
for sale, at reasonable prices; that his failure thus to supply the
demand might be interpreted as a relinquishment of his exclusive
right; and that his unfair enhancement of the price might result in
a forfeiture of the right of exclusion. (4 Burr. 2310, 2335.) In
these views Gould, J., on grounds of "public convenience," (17
Cobbett Parl. H. 983, 984,) and perhaps also Lord Mansfield, (4
Burr. 2407,) concurred. But Lord Northington had previously
expressed a different opinion, (2 Eden, 328,) which Yates, J.,
quoted with approbation; saying that, if the property existed,
"the public would have no tie upon authors or booksellers to
oblige them to keep a sufficient number of copies printed," and
that the inference of an abandonment from their omission to do so
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would be impossible. (4 Burr. 2392.) The opinion of Yates, J.,
in the course of which these remarks were made, has been respectfully mentioned by the Supreme Court of the United States, (8
Pet. 655); and Lord Camden, De Grey, C. J., Pollock, C. B., and
the Lord President of the Court of Session in Scotland, were of
opinion, that if the perpetual exclusive right existed, it included
the right of suppressing the supply. (17 Cobbett Parl. Hist. 1000,
991; 4 H. L. Ca. 936; Boswell's Report of Hinton vs. -Donaldson,
pp. 34, 35.)
The contrary notion of Willes, J., and Gould, J., was founded
upon assumed analogies in the law of monopolies, and the law as
to forestalling, regrating, and engrossing. The analogy to monopolies was mistaken. Exclusive rights within the definition of a
monopoly cannot exist anywhere without the support of an Act of
State, (3 Inst. 181; 2 Atk. 485; Hawk. P. C. Bk. I. c. 79; Skin.
169; 10 How. St. Tr. 380, 386, 424, 542); and, in the United
States, cannot be created otherwise than by an Act of Legislation,
or under the authority of such an act. (7 Pet. 319; 10 How. 493;
6 Wharton, 46; 11 Pet. 540 to 546; 10 How. 417.) The other
supposed analogy was not less mistaken. Forestalling, regrating,
or engrossing consisted in the fraudulent enhancement of the mar-

ket price of necessaries of life, by accumulating stores of them
through unfair purch'ases. But there never was anything illegal in a
refusal or omission to sell one's own stores, or in accumulating them
otherwise than by unfair purchases. In a time of dearth, or even famine, the product of a man's own land, though a necessary of life,
(such as a store of grain,) may be lawfully kept by him on hand. He
may illiberally refuse to sell it, or unwisely let it rot in his granary.
Even in the case of purchases which affected injuriously the market,
if the article was bought in order that it might become the subject of
any industrial process,-as where barley was to be malted, or grain
worked into starch,-its accumulation, though excessive, was never
unlawful. (Cro. J. 214; 3 Inst. 195; 13 Co. 18; 2 Brownl. 108;
Cro. Car. 231; J. Bridgm. 5, 6; go. 595, pl. 810; 2 Keb. 470; 1
East. 155 to 158.) The opinion of Willes, J., therefore, seems to
have had no sufficient legal foundation.
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Literary proprietorship, having thus a legitimate original source
in mental production, the question of its legal existence, absolute or
qualified, has been resolved into that of its capacity for continuance
after any profitable use of the composition. That this capacity exists independently of legislation has been denied on three grounds,
all of which have been already partially mentioned: the first, that
of the impossibility of a proprietary physical control of the embodiments; the second, that of the abstractly incorporeal nature of
the composition; and the third, that of the right of public use, which
may result from communications of the contents. Sometimes, the
first two objections have been considered as one; at other times, the
third has been discussed alone, as if it included the others, or superseded their consideration. But the three should be considered separately, in the order in which they have been stated.
To the first objection, the answer has been that, according to the
general law of property, the criterion of its capacity for continuance
is not the retention, by the original proprietor and his assigns, of
the possession or immediate control of the subject. The present or
eventual distinguishableness of the subject, enabling him to trace
back its identity with what was, in an absolute or qualified sense,
his own, suffices for the continuance of his absolute or qualified proprietorship. The proprietorship, thus traced, may have a present
or eventual existence, not in the original subject of it, but in a representative product or substitute, which may be specifically similar or different. The distinguisbableness may suffice, though embodiments of the subject, or of its products or substitutes, -may be
multiplied, however changeable may be their positions, and however
they may be beyond his control. The unauthorized use of the known
trade-mark of a manufacturer, or other dealer, is thus actionable.
This having been decided in England, at law, in 1824, conformably
to more ancient doctrine (3 Barnw. & Cress. 541; 33 Eliz. cited
Cro. J., 471; Poph. 144 ;), Lord Cottenham in 1838, in a case in
equity, where no fraud could be imputed, prevented, by injunction,
such a use of trade-marks, and said that the plaintiff had a title to
the marks. (3 Mylne & Cr. 352.) Though Lord Langdale after-
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wards, in 1842, thought that the right in a mere mark, or name in
trade, was not proprietary, but that the remedy was, in such cases,
founded alone upon the equitable jurisdiction to redress or prevent
fraud, (6 Beav. 78,) his opinion has not been followed. In 1853,
Vice-Chancellor Wood called a pin-maker's right of exclusive uie of
his labels a right of property acquiired by user. (11 Hare, 78; 23
Eng. L. & Eq., 55.) In 1856, in the Chancery Court of Appeal,
the right in a particular trade-mark was called by Lord Cranworth
a legal right, in support of which the jurisdiction of equity was exercised, in order to render it more effectual. (6 De G. Macn. &G.
217.) This he would scarcely have said, if he had not agreed with
Lord Cottenham in thinking the right proprietary. Specific changes
of embodiment are exemplified in cases in which the foreign investments, re-investments, and ultimate returns of commercial adventures are pledged, or otherwise appropriated, to secure pecuniary
advances on the outward consignments. For such cases, the rules
of the present law of the United States and England resemble those
which were applied in the ancient jurisprudence of both Greece' and
Rome. 2 The returns from remote regions, in varied specific forms,
become the substituted security for the outward adventures. The
special property which the lender had in them, for purposes of selfsecurity, is transferred to, and continues in, their product or substitute, in whatever ultimate form of investment, or of re-investment,

it may exist. (1 Peters, 444 to 448; 4 Wash. C. C. 418, 662; 4
Peters, 291; 1 Bos. & Pul. 568; 1 Curtis, 180; 8 How. 488, 439,
899, 400.) This qualified proprietor may not have any control of
the particular destinations abroad, or any right of custody of the
subject of his security until the termination of the adventure. The returns, before they reach their ultimate destination,
may be fraudulently sold, and their proceeds invested wrongfully.
The unauthorized investments may then, at the lender's option, be
followed; and, so long as they can be distinguished as the product
' Demosth.
2

in Lacrit. and in Dionysiod.

Dig. 22, 2. de naut. foen. ; also, 44, 7 de obl. et act. 23; and 45. 1 de verb. obl.

122, 1: Cod. 4, 32 de usur. 19, 26,
Sent. 2. 14 de usur., 3.

1; and 4. 33 de naut. fben; Faul. Recept.
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of, or substitute for, the former security, may be reclaimed by
him. His proprietary right ceases only when the subject ceases
to be thus distinguishable, and then ceases only because the means
of ascertainment fail. (3 M. & S. 578, as applied in 1 Pet. 448.)
Consequently, as a literary composition and its authorship are
distinguishable,wherever it may exist, the first objection fails.
The second objection, of its abstractly incorporeal nature, would
not, independently of the first objection, render the composition
incapable of being the subject of proprietorship. In proof that
rights not less abstractly incorporeal may be proprietary, the case
of an option, or a turn of an advowson, has been instanced, (1 W.
Bl. 388.) The doctrine of the Roman jurists and modern civilians,
that a sale and purchase may be valid, though the subject of it has
no physical existence, has been followed in English equitable jurisprudence. (ff 18, 1, 8, § 1; Poth. Vente 6; Merl. Repert, Vente
§ i, Art. i, ii; 8 Price 269, (n.) 1 Jac. & W. 262; 1 Hare 556,
557'; I Mylne & K., 488; affirming 4 Sim. 524.) The subject,
according to the civilians, may be a simple expectation, or a chance.
Examples of the sale of the draught of a net, or of a shot at game,
are followed by the remark, that when the seine is drawn or the
arrow sent, the price becomes due, though no fish be )hauled in, or
game brought down. The sale of next year's vintage, or peach
crop, or ice cutting, is a disposal not of the grapes, or peaches, or
ice, of which there may be none, but of the incorporeal right of
taking such grapes, or peaches, or ice, if any, as the seller's vineyard, or orchard, or pond may, during the season, yield. The
good-will of a trade or business, consisting in the mere probability
that old customers will desire to continue their former course of dealing and commercial association, "is a subject of value and price,"
which "may be sold, bequeathed, or become assets." (6 Ad. & El.
438.) "The advantage of anewswalk" has, accordingly, been "held
to be assets" of a deceased person's estate. (5 Bos. & Pul. 70.) An
established business may have a value independent of its continuance at the place where it has hitherto been transacted. (6 Beavan
I Cited 23 How. 129.
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276, 277.) In the case of a newspaper or other periodical journal
owned in partnership, the value of the subscription list, upon the
death of a partner, does not survive, but must be accounted for by
surviving partners in their settlement with his personal representative. (1 Parsons 298, 280, 297, 803; 7 Simons, 421.) Among
living persons, transfers of such subscription lists have been sustained, and effect has been judicially attributed to the continuance
of the former name under which a journal has been conducted or
other business carried on. (8 Yes. 215; 17 Yes. 842; 1 Sim. & S.
124; 1 W. Bl. 335; 1 Harris, 242.) The name, in such cases,
resembles a manufacturer's distinctive trademark, as to which the
law has already been stated. Such a mark, when used in an
established business, appears to be regarded in France as an accessory of the good will. (See Compere vs. Bajou, in Upton on Trademarks, 75, 78, from an authentic report in the New York Times of
I Feb. 1855.) Where products of artistic skill, resembling one
another specifically, are made for a particular market by many
producers, none of whom can monopolize the market, an exclusive
right of one of them to annex a particular mark to products of the
specific resemblance offered for sale in the market, is, perhaps,
more abstractly incorporeal than the right of literary proprietorship.
The second objection also, therefore, fails.
The third is founded on the rights of the public. This objection
and the answers to it involve a consideration of the effects and consequences of those profitable uses of a literary composition, of which
the methods have already been described.
A publication of such a composition is an act which renders its
contents, in any mode or degree, an addition to the store of human
knowledge.
Every communication of a knowledge of such contents, or of any
other primary result of mental developement, unless confidential,
is, more or less, a publication.
The peculiarities of the law of literary proprietorship, distinguish-
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ing the subject of such proprietorship from other incorporeal property, such, for example, as an easement, are chiefly dependent
upon effects or tendencies of publication. That the sole proprietorship of an author's manuscript, and of its incorporeal contents
wherever copies exist, is, independently of legislation, in himself
and his assigns until he publishes it, is a proposition which has been
twice recognized by the Supreme Court. (8 Pet. 657, 661; 14 How.
530, 531; and see 4 McL. 300.) In England, the authorities on the
subject have been reviewed in a recent case, in which this doctrine
was regarded as established. (2 De G. & Sm. 691; and see 1 Hall
& T. 21; 1 Macn. & G. 42.) In a subsequent case, the opinion
of this court appears to have been that literary proprietorship
exists when, and continues as long as, an exclusion of others from
the use and profit of the composition may consist with legitimate
effects of publication. (2 Wall, Jr. 564.)
An unqualified publication dedicates the contents to the public.
(See 2 Sto. Rep. 109 ; 1 Hall & T. 18 ; 4 Burr. 2335, 2863, 2364,
2365 ; 8 Pet. 655.) A landowner's express or implied concessions,
through which an easement is acquired by the public, are, also,
a dedication to the public. But, from the differences in the natures
of the respective subjects, the two dedications differ in such of their
legal effects as depend upon the dedicating proprietor's own definition of his intended purpose. In the case of an easement, his intention, so far as definable from his acts and omissions, always determines the existence of the rights of the public, and ascertains
their extent. (17 How. 426; 5 Watts & S. 141, 143; 8 Ad. &
El. 99 ; 5 Taunt. 127.) Wherever this intention is incapable of
taking effect, his dedication is ineffectual except as a mere licence
revocable at his pleasure. (11 M. & W. 830; 13 M. & W. 838.)
The existence of the public easement, in such a case, is thus not
less dependent than that of a private easement is in all cases,
upon the intention of the proprietor of the land in which it is exerciseable But, when a literary proprietor does an act which has
the effect of such a dedication, the public may acquire from it
rights independent of any optional definition by himself of his intention. The cases in which this may occur are of two classes;
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Cases of one class are those of "1dedication to a limited part of
the publie." Except in the single case of a charitable disposition,
unincorporated persons not individually ascertained are legally
incapable of acquiring property. That which would otherwise be
a dedication to the use of a limited number of unaseertained persons must, therefore, either enure to the benefit of the whole public, or take effect as a mere license. The latter is the effect when
the existence of an easement is in question. (11 M. & W. 830.)
So, in the case of a charitable disposition incapable of taking
effect, the former proprietorship continues. But, in the case of a
literary composition, the rule is the reverse. Thus, although the
number of a theatrical audience were strictly limited, however
small it might be, and however high the price of admission, yet, if
no discrimination were exercised as to the persons admitted, the
representation before such an audience would enure to the benefit
of the whole public. (See 12 Ad. & El. N. S.237.)
Cases of the other class are those of dedication to the whole
public for a limitedpurpose.: The purpose of the dedication of an
easement for public use may be limited. (2 Campb. 262 (n) ; 11 M.
& W. 830. See 5 Taunt. 127.) But, here again, the rule as to a
literary composition is different. When the composition is published without any discrimination as to persons, a restriction of the
purpose, or of the extent, of the publication would be futile. Such
a restriction cannot prevent ulterior diffusion of the knowledge of
the contents by unknown persons. After such diffusion, the publication could not be suppressed without injustice to other persons to
whom the knowledge might have been communicated. The restriction being thus, as to the public, a nullity, the effect of the publication is irrevocable and unlimited.
In the case already mentioned of a book published by subscription,
although the subscribers receive all the copies, the effect of the
publication is unqualified, because their delivery is unconditional.
In cases under all these heads, though a literary proprietor's
publication may thus have effects beyond his control, he may,
nevertheless, consistently with all that has hitherto been said, retain his fTrmer proprietary rights, except so far as his acts of pub-
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lication effectively enable others, either directly or secondarily, to
make ulterior publication. In cases of the dedication of easements,
the former proprietorship is always retained so far as its rights may
consist with rights of the public. How far such doctrine is
applicable to literary proprietorship is an inquiry which will not be
reached until after some other subjects have been considered.
The foregoing remarks are a sufficient preface to the distinctive
definitions of a limited and a general publication of a literary composition.
A limited publication of it is an act which communicates a knowledge of the contents to a select few, upon conditions expressly or
impliedly precluding its rightful ulterior communication, except in
restricted private intercourse. (2 De G. & Sm. 692; 1 Hall & T.
18; 4 McL. 800; 2 Sto. Rep. 109; 4 H. L. Ca. 965, 883, 919,
920; 2 Barnw. & Ald. 299, 801; 2 Eden, 829; 2 Meriv. 488;
Ambl. 694.)
Any publication which is not thus restricted, both as to persons
and purpose, is general. When the word publicationis used without an express qualification, a generalpublicationis usually meant.
Thus the public circulation of a printed copy or copies is called
publicationin print.
Private andpublic are adjectives which, of course, cannot qualify
the word publication. But recitations, lectures, and circulations,
which are specific methods of effecting publication, are, as we have
seen, called public or private. When they are called private, the
publication which they effect is limited. When they are called
public, it is designated as general. Recitations, lectures, and circulations, as methods of communicating a knowledge of the contents, are, as we have seen, called private or public, according to
their intended specific purposes, rather than their tendency to
cause a diffusion of the communicated knowledge beyond such purposes. The idea of this tendency always enters into the definition
of a publication though.it be a limited one. Every transgression
of the condition, express or implied, which, in the case of a limited
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publication, restricts the improper diffusion of the knowledge is,
therefore, in a court of equity, redressed as a breach of confidence,
not less than as an infraction of proprietary right.
When thus explained, the phraseology which designates a private recitation, lecture, or circulation, as a limited publication,
and a public recitation, lecture, or circulation as a general publication, is, perhaps, not liable to just criticism. But, if the
phraseology were liable to any critical objection, convenience,
if not necessity, would have suggested its legal adoption, or that
of some equivalent expressions. Otherwise, a theatrical representation before a select audience, the circulation of a manuscript,
and the restricted circulation of a printed book, which are, in common parlance, called private, could not have been designated, as,
in any sense or degree, publications. The phraseology, whether
otherwise liable to criticism or not, has, at all events, been judicially sanctioned. (2 De G. & Sm. 692; 1 Hall & T. 18; and see
the other cases last cited.)
In the case of a private theatrical representation of a play of
which no printed copy has been circulated, the exclusion of all
except the few selected for admission, so defines the condition on
which they attend as to preclude ulterior publication. Such publication, by any of the audience, would be redressed or prevented
by a court of equity both as a breach of implied confidence and as
an infraction of proprietary right.
Lord Brougham compared a case of private circulation,described
by him as a communication of the contents "to a select few placed
under conditions," with a case of a restricted private easement:
(4 H. L. Oa 965.) The context of his opinion shows that he perhaps did not mean to state this as a perfect analogy ; but the
comparison is, for some purposes, useful. If a man, having a private right of using a passage by land or water, between two
places of his own, uses it as a passage to and from another place of
his own, he cannot, because, in doing so, he passed from one to the
other of the two first-mentioned places, justify the excessive use
of the privilege. In such a case, the argument that, when he had
used the passage between the limits designated, he might afterwards
6
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pass "whither he would," has not availed as an excuse. (1 MIod.
190, 191; 1 Ro. Abr. 391; 4 M. & W. 773, 774; 11 Ad. & El.
759; 1 Whart. 333 ; 5 Watts & S. 140, 143; 11 Harris, 348.) So,
where an engraver who takes impressions from a plate, or a printer
who prints from a manuscript, strikes off more than the stipulated number of impressions, an action at common law lies against
him, (1 Barnw. & Adolph, 711;) and a court of equity, on the ground
of proprietary right in the owner of the plate or manuscript, will
not only prevent, by injunction, any use of the copies unauthorizedly made, but will order them to be destroyed. (2 De G. & Sm.
716 to 718; 4 H. L. Ca. 833.)
As publication is not directly effected by printing, but follows it,
the rule of decision, in this case of an excess in the number of impressions, would be the same, whether the purpose of the literary
proprietor was a general or a liniited publication. But, after a
publication, the difference in its character, or defined purposes,
causes a difference in the judicial purpose of the redress afforded.
In the case of a limited publication, the purpose of the redress
is to maintain the privacy which the restrictive condition was intended to secure. When an exclusive privilege has been secured
by statute in a book which is publicly circulated, a stranger who,
in whole or in part, reproduces it in the new form of a translation,
or abridgment, or index, or table of contents, or analytical review,
does not infringe the statutory privilege. But either of these acts
would violate the rights of the literary proprietor of a book of
which the circulation had been private only. (2 De G. & Sm. 692
to 697; 4 H. L. Co. 833.) The doctrine may be exemplified conversely. Unauthorized impressions of a lawfully possessed copy
of a musical composition, equalling in their number, but not exceeding, that of such members of a musical society as were to take
part in a concert at which it was to be performed, were lithographically made, and gratuitously distributed for the purposes of the
concert, among these members only. The tracings on the stones
were then effaced. In this case, the rights of the proprietor of the
musical composition were violated. (12 C. B. 177.) As others than
members of the society were admitted to the concert on the pay-
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ment of entrance money, the case was not that of a private performance or limited publication. If, however, none others had
been admitted, so that the performance would have been of this
character, the rights of this proprietor would still, according to the
reasoning of the decision, have been violated. But, if, before any
other publication on his own part, he had himself authorized such
an impression of copies as was made, and their distribution for
such a private concert, the same reasoning indicates that this
would not have had the effect of a dedication of the composition
by him to the public.
The legal analogy to the case of a private easement is maintainable so long as the literary proprietor may be able to enforce the restrictive condition, express or implied, on which he may have privately circulated a copy. His difficulty is, not in enforcing the
condition against the party receiving the copy, but in enforcing it
against other persons not privy to the restriction. In respect of
independent rights which such other persons may acquire, the analogy to an easement fails. This leads to the remark that a limited
publication through which, contrary to its intended purpose, a
knowledge of the contents is diffused indiscriminately, becomes, in
effect, as to the world at large, a general publication. The enforcement of the restrictive condition may become impossible whenever
the effect of the publication is more extended than its purpose. A
book privately circulated may have been read, quoted, reviewed,
and remembered, so extensively as to have become a part of the
general stock of literature; This alone, when the restrictive purpose has been imperfectly made known, must suffice to annul the
restriction. The case is different where, as in that of Ion, the announcement of the restriction appears upon every copy: But, even
in such a case, the limits of any restriction which can be fairly
and reasonably imposed, may be exceeded: When it is exceeded,
the rights of the public must be regarded. Thus, if the first edition of Ion had been a full one, the notice of the author's intended
restriction would probably not have effectually limited the character of his publication. He published a second edition with a reprint of the notice on the title page. But he prefaced this edition
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with a concession that the composition could no longer be regarded
as his own. Even where the limited publication retains its restrictive character, a greater or less tendency to a diffusion of the
knowledge beyond the border of its intended restraint may always
exist in modes altogether foreign to the law of easements.
Thus, even in the case of a limited publication, irrevocable rights
may, through its effects, become vested in the public. The liability
or tendency to such effects is a reason for the vigilant exercise of
equitable powers to prevent parties and privies to the restrictive
condition from performing acts through which the public may thus
acquire such irrevocable rights. In discussing the doctrine of literary proprietorship under this head, Sir J. L. Knight Bruce said that
"1the species or kind of the thing in which property was claimed
had, of course, to be particularly considered in considering the
question whether a right in it was invaded, and how invasion should,
in the particular case, be prevented or redressed; and this class of
property, by nature, not corporeal at all, or not exclusively corporeal, required to be defended against incorporeal attacks, and not
at all, or not exclusively, against bodily assaults. Upon the principle, therefore, of protecting property, it is, that the common law,
in cases not aided or prejudiced by statute, shelters the privacy and
seclusion of thoughts and sentiments committed to writing, and desired by the author to remain not generally known." (2 De G. &
Sm. 695.)
Except so far as independent equities may have been acquired
by strangers, literary proprietorship of the subject of a limited
publication is, therefore, not less entitled than a private easement
in land to judicial protection. That the subject, in the former case
is personal property, but an easement real property, does not affect
the truth of this remark. (See 2 Eden, 329.)
Effects of a general publication will next be considered. All the
specific effects of such a publication, as dependent upon its different
modes, may be exemplified in the case of a dramatic literary composition.
Under this head, the practical question is whether, after such a
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publication, others than the author and his assigns may lawfully
republish, in print, or theatrically.
The purpose of the statutes for the protection of literary proprietors is to restrain the rights of others to republish. The cases
to which these laws apply have been specified under a former head.
We have seen that, in the present case, the rights of the public are
unaffected by any legislative restriction.
We have also seen that, as the play in question was never printed,
the complainant, as its literary proprietor, could have sustained her
suit if the defendants' theatrical representation had not been preceded by her own. This is undisputed. The question is upon the
effect of her own previous public performance of the play. This
performance was, on her part, an act of general publication. The
question to be considered is twofold; first, whether this theatrical
publication by her, if it had been the means of enabling the defendants fairly to bring out the play at their theatre, would have defeated her suit; secondly, whether, as this publication was not thus
the means of enabling them to do so, they can take advantage
of it in order to defeat the suit.
Upon the first question the law was formerly involved in doubt
but is no longer uncertain. An opinion upon it has already been
expressed, without any particular statement of the reasons. In the
absence of legislation, when a literary proprietor has made a general publication in any of the modes which have been described,
other persons acquire unlimited rights of republishing in anymodes
in which his publication may directly or secondarily enable them to
republish. Therefore, the literary proprietor of an unprinted play
cannot, after making or sanctioning its representation before an
indiscriminate audience, maintain an objection to any such literary
or dramatic republication by others as they may be enabled, either
directly or secondarily, to make from its having been retained in the
memory of any of the audience. We have seen that the manager
of a theatre may prevent a reporter from noting the words of such
a play phonographically or stenographically or otherwise. As one
of the audience, he would, in doing so, transgress the privileges conceded in his admission. But the privileges of listening and of re-
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tention in the memory cannot be restrained. Where the audience
is not a select one, these privileges cannot be limited in either their
immediate or ulterior consequences.
If purchases of manuscript plays, from the earliest periods of
theatrical representations, have recognized the literary proprietorship of such compositions as existing until their public performance,
we find no trace of any recognition of the continuance of exclusive
rights in dramatic authors or their assigns after such publication.
Among the ancients, the knowledge of polite literature was acquired, and literary tastes were cultivated, not less by attendance
at recitations of the bard and the rhetorician, and at representations of theatrical performances, than by reading such few copies
of works of established reputation as were accessible. The knowledge thus acquired, and the tastes thus developed, were no longer
the exclusive property of the author and his assigns. When a dramatic or other composition, in verse or in prose, had been performed, recited, or sung, to a public assembly, every one of the
audience was at liberty to publish elsewhere, at all times, as much of
it as he might be able from recollection to write or to repeat orally.
Neither the author, nor those who, by his consent, had first published it, could reclaim it or limit the extent or effect of its primary
publication. It might, afterwards, be represented, said, or sung, it
will, by other persons, to other audiences, in the same place, or elsewhere. In 1773, Judge Boswell, (Lord Auchinleck,) in the Scotch
Court of Session, after observing that anciently very valuable performances were preserved only by the memory, and, referring to the
cases of Homer and of Ossian, said that, within his own remembrance, the ballad of Chevy Chase had been repeated by every
body. (Boswell's Report of finton vs. Donaldson, p. 5.)
Two plays, The Agreeable Surprise, first performed in 1781,
and The Young Quaker, first performed in 1783, which were
afterwards the respective subjects of two reported English cases,
had been transferred by O'Keefe, their author, to the proprietor
of the Haymarket Theatre. The assistance of Mr. Allibone,
whose forthcoming second volume of the Dictionary of Authors
will contain a notice of O'Keefe, enables me to state that at a
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much later period than the date of the last of the two reported
cases, neither of these plays was contained in any list of regular dramatic- publications. (See Gent. Mag. Apr. 1883, p.
876; and Jones Contin. of Baker and Reed's Biogr. Dramat.
Tit. O'Keefe, where N. P. signifies not printed.) O'Keefe, in his
"Recollections," published after the date of the last of them,
states that the plays had "been repeatedly printed and published
surreptitiously," meaning, without his leave, or that of the party
to whom he had transferred them. They were not printed among
his dramatic works, also published long after the same date.
Thus, they never were authorizedly published in print. O'Keefe,
with the permission of the proprietor of the Haymarket Theatre,
sold a copy of The Young Quaker to the manager of a Dublin
theatre, for the express or implied purpose of enabling him to represent it there. A Dublin bookseller printed and published it in
1784, probably from this copy. There is in the Philadelphia
Library (D. 4806, (5)) a copy of this edition, which appears to have
been issued in the form of a book printed for general circulation.
From the legal reports of the two cases, both very obscure, we cannot infer that either of the plays was judicially known to have been
printed. The manager of a theatre at Richmond performed The
Agreeable Surprise, without the consent of the proprietor of the
Haymarket Theatre, who sued him for the penalty imposed by the
statute, 8 An. c. 19, for an unauthorized publication. The case was
decided in 1793. The author, as he states in his Recollections, was
examined as a witness on the trial, which was before Lord Kenyon. The only evidence which appears to have been given was the
proof of his authorship, of his transfer to the plaintiff, and of the
representation by the defendant. The fact that it had been
printed, probably, was not in evidence. But the previous frequent
theatrical representations of it by the plaintiff during many successive
years was, doubtless, either proved or admitted; The verdict having
been in his favor, his counsel, on a motion for a new trial, argued
that there had been "sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude
that the work had been printed, for it could not be supposed that
the performers could, by any other means, have exhibited so per-
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fect a representation of the work." This point was not decided.
The verdict was set aside on the ground that the only publication
by which the statutory penalty could be incurred was a publication
in print. But, Buller, J., said, "Reporting (qu: repeating) anything from memory can never be a publication within the statute.
Some instances of strength of memory are very surprising. But
the mere act of repeating such a performance cannot be left as evidence to a jury that the defendant had pirated "the work itself."
(Coleman vs. Wathen, 3 D. & E. 245.) The case as to the Young
Quaker did not occur until the year 1820, when an intended performance of it at the English Opera House was announced by an
advertisement at London.
The proprietor of the Haymarket
Theatre, to whom the author had transferred it in 1783, had
been succeeded by other proprietors, who filed a bill in chancery
and applied for an injunction to prevent the performance at the
Opera House. The application was heard ex parte before Lord
Eldon, who, after a difficulty in showing the derivation of the complainants' title had been partially removed, granted the injunction.
(Iforrisvs. Kelly, 1 J. & W. 461.) That the play had been publicly performed for more than a third of a century by themselves,
and those under whom their title was derived, must have appeared.
The report, however, states neither this fact, nor on what ground
the injunction was asked or granted. Whether the bill was founded on an asserted general right of literary proprietorship, or on
the defendants' intended use of a copy of the edition improperly
printed in Dublin, or on any and what other assertion of right, can
only be conjectured. According to the previous decision in the
case of The Agreeable Surprise, Lord Eldon cannot have granted
this injunction, as to the Young Quaker, on any assumed foundation of a statutory right in the complainant. In a subsequent case,
a complainant had the copyright of Lord Byron's tragedy of Marino Faliero, and had printed and published it for sale, when,
without his, or Lord Byron's permission, the defendant represented it theatrically in a curtailed form, under the designation of
an abridgment. Lord Eldon sent the case to the King's Bench
for an opinion upon the question whether the plaintiff could main-
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tain an action against the defendant for publicly representing the
tragedy thus abridged. The court certified its opinion in the negative. The case does not appear to have been determined on the
ground that the abridgment was a fair one, but, upon the ground,
heretofore stated, that under the only statute of copyright then in
force in England, a proprietor of a dramatic literary composition,
after a general publication in print, had no redress for an unauthorized theatrical representation. The counsel, on opposite sides,
referring to the case of The Agreeable Surprise, which play they
conceded to have been acted only, and not printed, called it a different or converse case. This case of Marino Faliero, was in
1822. (Hurray vs: .Elliston, 5 Barnw. & Ald. 657. See the remarks upon the case in 12 Ad. & El. N. S. 236.)
In an action, by the literary proprietor of a play for an unauthorized theatrical representation of it, if the whole evidence consisted in proof of his proprietorship, his own public theatrical
representation of it, and a subsequent performance of it by the
defendant, the legal presumption, according to the dictum of Buller, J., would be, that the impression of the plaintiff's own performance upon the memory of his own audience had been, directly
or secondarily, the means of enabling the defendant to perform the
play. The expression by Buller, J., of this opinion, was altogether extrajudicial. It, probably, was contrary to the opinion of
Lord Kenyon, acted upon at the trial.
Such a question of evidence is, perhaps, of little practical importance in a Court of Equity, where a discovery of the means by
which a defendant has been enabled to represent a piece theatrically can always be obtained. Thus, in the present case, we know
that the complainant's pirevious performance of the play in question was not the means of enabling the defendants to bring it out
at their theatre. The trial of such a question at law must always
be, more or less, difficult. But the rule of evidence, as Buller, J.,
stated it, seems to be dependent upon reasons which, though, perhaps, anciently sufficient, are, according to modern usages, almost
obsolete. That a theatrical performance at one theatre can enable
performers at another to repeat a play, word for word, or nearly
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word for word, must often be too improbable for rational credence.
Therefore, when a plaintiff has proved his own literary proprietorship, and the conformity of the two representions, the burden
of proof ought, perhaps, in an ordinary case, to rest upon the
defendant. When like evidence has been adduced in an action by
the patentee of an invention, the burden of proof is usually thus
cast upon a defendant. When an unprinted play has, for many
years, been so frequently performed as to render it familiar to the
dramatic profession and to constant attendants at the theatre, a
defendant may be able to relieve himself of such a burden, by
proving that the means of performing it were fairly derived by
him from its previous public representation. The law certainly
recognizes the possibility that this may occur. Its occurence may,
perhaps, not have been even improbable in the particular case of
The Agreeable Surprise. But this would not establish any
such rule of evidence as that which Buller, J., is reported to have
stated. If Lord Eldon had followed such a rule, he could scarcely
have made the order for an injunction in the case of the Young
Quaker. But, independently of the mere question of evidence,
the doctrine of the dictum of Buller, J., as to repetitionfrom tte
memory of the audience, may be regarded as established.
At the dates of these decisions, opinions were divided on the
more important question, whether a literary proprietor had, independently of legislation, a perpetual copyright. In England, a
majority of the judges of the King's Bench decided, in 1769, that
such a proprietor had, at the common law, a copyright, through
which, notwithstanding his own general publication in print, he
retained the perpetual exclusive right of republishing. (4 Burr.
2803.) This decision was in opposition to the views which seem
to have been prevalent on the continent of Europe, where, however, the subject was obscured, as it had formerly been in England,
by the prevalence of the systems of censorship, and of governmental grants of exclusive printing privileges. A decree in
Chancery made in another case, conformably to the decision in
the King's Bench, was reversed by the House of Lords in 1774,
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upon the ground that the copyright, if it existed at the common
law in perpetuity, was limited in its duration by the statute
8 An. c. 19. But, in the House of Lords, the opinions of the judges
were taken; and, upon the question, as it would have stood if
unaffected by the statute, a majority of them concurred in the
previous opinion of the majority of the judges of the King's Bench.
(17 Cobb. Parl. Hist. 953 to 1003; 2 Br. P. C. by Toml. 129;
4 Burr. 2408 to 2417.) In the mean time, however, in 1773, the
contrary opinion had been expressed by the Scotch Court of Session, in a decision concurred in by twelve of thirteen judges present. (Hfinton v. Donaldson, Boswell's Report.) An objection to
the opinion of the majority of the English judges was, that preventing republication, without the former literary proprietor's consent, would enable him, at pleasure, to suppress that which had
been authorizedly published. To this objection some of these
judges had answered, as we have seen, that the continuance of
his exclusive right was dependent upon an implied condition that
he should keep always in the market an adequate supply of printed
copies for sale at reasonable prices. That no such condition could
legally be implied, has already been fully shown. The objection,
therefore, was not sufficiently answered. The opinion of the majority of the judges, or of some of them, was thus founded, in part,
upon an erroneous doctrinal assumption. There was, in law, no
middle position between two extreme opposing opinions. One of
them was that a literary proprietor, notwithstanding an authorized unrestricted publication, retained an unqualified right, indefinite in its duration, enabling him, at pleasure, to sell or to republish
on his own terms, or arbitrarily to suppress both sale and republication. The Court of King's Bench had, in effect, so decided. The
other, and contrary, opinion was, that, in the absence of legislation, an unrestricted circulation of a printed copy dedicated the
composition irrevocably to the public, for every such use, including republication, as could be made of such copy. The Supreme
Court of the United States, in 1834, adopted the latter opinion.
(8 Pet. 591 ; see 17 How. 454.) Opposing views of the question
had, until then, been entertained. Opinions upon it, in England,
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continued to differ until 1854, when the preponderance of authority was there determined, conformably to the opinion of the
Supreme Court of the United States. This preponderance was
thus determined in England by the concurring opinions of Lords
Cranworth, Brougham, and St. Leonards, in the House of
Lords, against the views which a majority of the judges of the
courts of law again expressed. (4 11. L. Ca. 815, reversing 6
Exch. 592, and affirming in principle, 4 Exch. 145, and compare
12 Com. B. 187 with 17 Coin. B. 444.)
In cases not legislatively provided for, the public circulation of
a literary composition thus authorizes any person to republish it
from any copy so circulated. If it is a dramatic composition, it
may be republished either by reprinting it, or by theatrical representation. If we now recur to the case of a dramatic composition,
which, though unprinted, has been publicly represented on the stage,
we will see that the principle applicable must be the same, so far
as this representation of it may have been the means of enabling
ulterior publication to be made. This brings us to the conclusion,
already stated, that if the complainant's previous representation
of the play in question had been the means through which the
defendants were fairly enabled to represent it, the present suit
could not be maintained.
But the complainant's own representation of it was not the means
of thus enabling them to represent it; and the final question, which
is now reached, is, whether, under such circumstances, the mere fact
that she had publicly performed it is to defeat her suit. This proposition is resolvable into the question already stated, whether a
literary proprietor who has published in any of the modes above
described as general, does not afterwards retain his proprietary
rights, except so far as, by thus publishing, he may enable others to
make ulterior publication, or otherwise to use the composition.
All reasons founded in legal analogies require that such an ultimate proprietary dominion should be thus retained by an author
and his assigns. The general doctrine of proprietary right is exem-
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plified in a landowner's retention of his ultimate proprietorship after
his dedication of the most unlimited easements to the public. A
literary proprietor's retention of a resthlting interest after such a
publication is perfectly compatible with every other person's unlimited right of republishing, and otherwise using unrestrictedly, that
which has been published. In cases which may be stated, a denial
of the continuance of such a resulting interest would seem almost,
if not quite, absurd. The sale of a single copy only of a first edition
of a book is a general publication. In such a case, if its literary
proprietor has possession of all the other copies and of the manuscript from which they were printed, and, wishing to suppress the
publication, buys back the copy sold before it has been read, he
must stand on the same footing as if he had never parted with it
That, before he got it back, the purchaser may have read it, can make
no rational difference, unless the impression on the latter's memory
may enable him to make ulterior publication. The supposition of
a less extreme case is not required in order to prove the necessity
for the retention of a resulting literary proprietorship. In England,
the Statute 5 and 6 Vict. c. 45, § 18, enacted that when the proprietor, &c., of any encyclopeedia, &c., had employed, or should
employ, any persons to compose any articles, or portions thereof,
on the terms that the copyright should belong to such proprietor,
&c., the copyright therein should be his property, and that he
should enjoy the same rights as if he were the actual author, and
should have such term of copyright therein as was given by the act
to the authors of books. Notwithstanding this enactment, the proprietor of an encyclopmdia, who employs a person to write an article
for publication in it, and pays him for the article, cannot, in England,
without the writer's consent, publish the article in a separate form,
or otherwise than in the encyclop~edia, unless it was written on the
terms that the copyright in it should belong, for all purposes, to
the proprietor of the encyclopoedia. Shadwell, V. C., in so deciding,
said that the original composer of the article had the copyright in
it, except so far as he parted with it, and that no reservation was
necessary to constitute a right in him. (16 Sim. 196, 198.) The
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reasoning is not less applicable in the present case than if the proprietary right now in question were statutory.
If the principle in question exists, it must apply to such representations of an unprinted play as are not the means of enabling ulterior dramatic or literary publication to be made. In Macklin vs.
_ichardson, the complainant was the author of the farce, in two
acts, called Love i la Mode, which had never been printed, but had
been several times performed, with his permission, during six years.
He received a compensation for giving such permission, and never
permitted the manuscript to be out of his control, always taking it
back so soon as the performance of the piece was finished. The
defendants, proprietors of a monthly journal, employed a short-hand
writer to report the words of this play, by taking them down from
the mouths of the actors during its performance. When this had
been done, one of the defendants, from his memory, corrected this
reporter's notes, and published the first act in their journal, for
April, 1766, with a notice that the second act would be published
in the next monthly number. The complainant having filed a bill
in Chancery for an account and injunction, Lord Northington
granted an injunction till answer, which was afterwards continued
by him until the hearing. When the cause afterwards came on for
a hearing before Lord Camden, the case in the King's Bench,
afterwards decided in 1769, upon the question of copyright at common law, was pending in that Court. Lord Camden ordered the
cause to stand over until the determination of that case. After its
decision, the cause in Chancery was again heard in 1770, when the
injunction was made perpetual by the Commissioners of the Great
Seal. It had been argued that the previous representation of the
farce on the stage was a publication "which gave a right to any of
the audience to carry away what they could, and make any use of
it," and that the printing it was, therefore, no injury to the complainant. But Lord Commissioner Smythe said that this was a
mistake; for, besides the advantage from the performance, the
author had another means of profit, from the printing and publishing,
and that there was as much reason that he should be protected in
that right as any other author; and Lord Commissioner Bathurst
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said that printing it before the author had printed it was doing him
a great injury. (Ambl. 694; 17 Cobbett Parl. Hist. 1094.) It can
scarcely be necessary to refer to forris vs. Kelly, (1 J. & W. 461,)
or any other case, to show that, on the principle of this decree, the performance of Love 6 la Mode at another theatre, from the short-hand
writer's report, would also have been prevented by an injunction.
As the decision in the King's Bench, which preceded the final
decree in Macklin vs. lichardson, has been overruled in England
by the subsequent cases in 1774 and 1854, in the House of Lords,
it is not altogether unimportant that the prior injunction had been
granted and continued by Lord Northington in 1766, before the
decision in the King's Bench. Lord Northington's views differed
so far from those of the Court of King's Bench, that he had, in
1765,1 dissolved the injunction in the very case decided by that
Court in 1769.2 He, therefore, in continuing the injunction in Macklin vs. Richardson, must have been of opinion that a resulting literary proprietorship might continue in a dramatic author after a public theatrical representation. In 1849, Sir J. L. Knight Bruce, (2 De
G. & Sm. 692,) referring to the cases of The Agreeable Surprise,
(Coleman vs. Tathen, 5 D. & E. 245,) and Marino Faliero (Murray
vs. .Elliston, 5 B. & A. 657,) both of which have been fully noticed,
said that neither of them was opposed to the decision in Macklin
vs. Richardson. He, therefore, must have considered it as a
decision of authority. The authority of his opinion, in 1849, is not
affected by the subsequent case in the House of Lords in 1854,
because he very carefully avoided recognizing or acting upon the
former views which that case overruled.
Macklin vs. .Richardson, if to be followed as an authority, is
decisive of the present case. A like remark might be made as to
Morris vs. Kelly. (1 J. & W. 461.) But, independently of these
authorities, we have seen that legal reason and analogy are in favor
of the existence of a resulting literary proprietorship in an author
and his assigns, after a general publication, so far as this publication
may not be the means of enabling ulterior publication to be made.
Such a resulting proprietary dominion must, therefore, be retained
1 2 Eden, 327.

2 4 Burr., 2303.
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in the case of a dramatic literary composition, unless the retention
is repugnant essentially to some necessary consequence of a public
theatrical representation.
The resulting or ultimate proprietary
right is defined so as to preclude the notion of any practical repugnancy. There can be no legal repugnancy, if the doctrine of the
continuance of literary proprietorship after a qualified or limited
publication can be maintained in any case whatever.
If uses
of literary property can be modified by restrictive conditions, its
legal nature must be such that a literary proprietor's dedication to
the public is also limited in its effects by the extent of the public
use. The resulting literary proprietrship, after such a dedication,
mighst continue, though a limited publication were impossible, but
must continue, if the limited publication is, in any case, possible.
The remaining inquiry is, whether the particular doctrines which
have been stated under these two specific heads, have, in any respect,
been changed by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States, in 1834, that copyright had no existence at common law,
and the conforming English opinions in the House of Lords in 1854.
In the United States, the doctrine of limited publication, as above
defined, has, in its application to unprinted compositions, been
authoritatively recognized, and its rules judicially enforced in cases
which have occurred since 1834. (4 MoL. 300; 2 Sto. Rep. 100;
4 Duer, 379, 382, 385; and see 14 How. 530, 531.) The general
subject is one upon which judicial authority in the United States
has led, rather than followed, the course of decision in England.
The specific doctrine, as to limited publication, had been established
in England, as applied to manuscripts, before the cases in the King's
Bench in 1769, and House of Lords in 1774. The same specific
doctrine had been further developed in that country before the
general subject was again considered in the House of Lords in 1854.
In the case in the latter year, Lord Brougham succinctly and cautiously, but clearly, conceded the specific doctrine; and guarded it
by the restrictions required, in order to maintain its conformity to
the principles which now determine the effect of a general publication. (4 H. L. Ca. 965.) His opinion in 1854, and that Qf
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Yates, J., in 1769, are the leading ones in support of these principles. (See 8 Pet. 655.) Yates J., had stated the question to be,
whether literary proprietorship existed in perpetuity after an
authorized "general publication," using the phrase generalpublication in a sense very like that in which dedication to the public is
ordinarily used, and conceding a literary proprietor's exclusive right
of priority of publication, and his retention of the proprietorship
of his manuscript after publication. (4 Burr. 2355, 2363, 2364,
2365, 2379, 2390, 2360.) As to the right of priority of publication,
he thought that a literary proprietor had the sole right of judging
whether he would make the contents "public, or commit them only
to the sight of his friends," (p. 2379.) This was approaching as
near to the definition of a limited publication as the case in question,
which was confessedly that of a general publication, required. In
the course of the same opinion, Yates, J., said that the effect of a
publication, meaning of a general one, was irrevocable. A dedication to the public of an easement, where the dedicating proprietor's
resulting dominion is retained, is likewise irrevocable. Therefore,
the irrevocability of the public use of a composition which its literary
proprietor dedicates to the public, is immaterial. The question is,
whether, subject always to this public use, his ultimate proprietorship
may not continue.
The principal argument of those who contended that there was
a copyright at common law, was that if the exclusive rights of literary proprietorship were not maintainable after publication, a literary composition could not be used with afiy sufficient certainty of
profit. That of which no profitable use of any kind is possible, cannot become a subject of proprietary right. The argument was, that
literary proprietorship was not profitable except through publication, and that if a first publication gave to every body an immediate
unrestricted right of republishing, the so-called literary property
was not property at all. The premises of this argument were not
absolutely true, if a literary proprietor could, in any case, limit the
effects of a publication by restrictive conditions, or if he retained,
after a general publication, an ultimate proprietary dominion subject to the public use. The opponents of the argument contented
7
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themselves, however, with refuting it on the simpler ground thata
literary proprietor's exclusive right of priority of publication sufficed alone to render the property of some value, notwithstanding
the dedication to the public effected by an unrestricted circulation
The argument was, morein print. (4 Burr, 2379; 8 iPet. 657.)
over, by some of its opponents retorted, so as to give to it an apparently self-destructive tendency. Thus, if its premises had been
absolutely true, it would have extended so far beyond its intended
purpose as entirely to defeat an author's claim to literary property
before, as well as after, publication. In proportion as the argument
appeared convincing or plausible, its tendency was towards this
result. The consequence was that while those who made the argument pushed the claims of authors unreasonably far, one, or more,
of its judicial opponents denied the existence of any literary proprietorship in the incorporeal composition even before publication.
Other opponents of the argument, professing to deny only the continuance of literary property after publication, admitted its previous existence in so timid or imperfect a manner as might impliedly have excluded the recognition of a right of making qualified
or limited publication in any case. This course of reasoning on
opposite sides had a tendency to obscure distinctions which have,
in the present case, required full development.
The argument thus apparently answered, by denials of its premises, was not quite refuted by such denials. Its premises, though
not absolutely true, were so far, in a relative sense, practically true,
that the argument might perhaps have prevailed if it had not encountered another answer.
The more decisive answer was that the foundation of the argument lay in a misconception of the character and extent of the
rights of the public in the incorporeal contents of a printed book
which has been unrestrictedly circulated. (2 Wall, Jr. 564.) These
rights may include that of republishing it more or less extensively.
General readers, and particular students, have their own independent rights of using the knowledge of its contents, and of diffusing
this knowledge in modes and for purposes of their own. Its literary proprietor may dislike the modes, or feel no concern in the
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purposes. He may have opposing interests, or feelings, or prejudices. The literary proprietorship may have been changed.
Though the person may have been unchanged, his motives and
opinions may have altered. The possibility that authors may
desire to suppress their literary productions, and the probability
that literary proprietors will sometimes publish in methods unwise, capricious, oppressive, or illiberal, have been judicially
recognized. (2 Mferiv, 438 ; 17 Cobb. Parl. Hiist. 1000, 991;
4 Hi. L. Ca. 936; Boswell's Report of Mutton. vs. Donaldson,
pp. 34, 35.) The protection of the rights of the public should
not be dependent upon the arbitrary will of a literary proprietor, or upon the influence of any motives of self-interest by
which he may probably be actuated. These rights of the public,
including that of republishing, unless they are legislatively restricted, are not less absolute than his own. lie should, therefore,
after publicly circulating his composition, have no exclusive privileges except such as may have been legislatively conferred, or such
as others may be incapable of exercising.
These were the views which prevailed in the United States, and,
ultimately, in England. In reviewing the authorities, it must be
remembered that the word yuilication,when unexplained, almost
always means a general publication. Thus Yates, J., and other
judges, have described the effects of publication in the cases of an
invention and a literary composition as alike. Here the meaning
intended was that the right of public use consequent upon a dedication to the public was, in each case, irrevocable and unrestricted.
(4 Burr. 2360, 2361, 2386, 2387. See 2 De G. & Sm. 696.) This
doctrine was perfectly true. The statement of it in a case in which
the publication was confessedly general, required no discrimination
to be made in consequence of the intrinsic distinguishableness of a
literary composition as the production of an author who is or may
be known. We have, however, seen that this intrinsic distinguishableness may prevent a properly restricted publication of a literary
composition from becoming a dedication to the public, and that
such a composition is different, in this respect, from an invention,
because the authorship and novelty of an invention require extrin-

LAURARKEENE vs. WHEATLEY & CLARKE.

sic attestation. The doctrine stated by these judges implied no
exclusion of such distinctions where these differences exist. A
limited publication, though not possible in the case of an invention,
may, therefore, be recognized as quite possible in that of a literary
composition. The retention of any resulting dominion over an
invention after it has been published may be likewise incompatible with effects of its publication. We have, however, seen that
no such incompatible effects ensue from the general publication of
a literary composition; but that, on the contrary, the subsequent
retention of such an ultimate dominion is a legitimate incident of
literary proprietorship.
Since facklin vs. Rie/hardson was decided, ninety years ago,
no case except the obscurely-reported one of Morris vs. Kelly,
exemplifying this doctrine, has occurred. The unsettled condition
of the law of literary property at the dates of those cases, the
obscurity in which its doctrines have until a recent period been
involved, and the difficulty of applying practically the metaphysical reasoning upon the subject in the books, have rendered an extended investigation of it necessary. The conclusion deduced, under
this head, is, that, as the complainant's prior theatrical publications
were not the means of enabling the defendants fairly to bring out
this play at their theatre, she is, on the ground of literary proprietorship, entitled to a decree. These views are, I think, warranted
by those of this court in the case reported in 2 Wallace, Jr., 547.
But if the decision of the cause depended on this point alone, I
would not make such a decree without a reargument in the presence
of the Circuit Judge.
I

The case recapitulated stands thus: The complainant having the
literary proprietorship of this comedy, but no statutory copyright
in it, and having publicly performed it at her theatre, with an intention to continue its public performance there, the defendants,
against her will, performed it repeatedly at their theatre, without
having been, directly or secondarily, enabled so to do through its impression upon the memory of any of her audience. This was an infraction of a proprietary right retained by the complainant. Inde-
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pendently also of such right, she is entitled to redress, because the
defendants enabled themselves to represent the play by knowingly
taking advantage of a breach of confidence committed by a person
in her employment.
If an issue should be asked by either party within ten days, it
will be ordered. A special venire may be directed, and the proceeding regulated by suitable orders. Among them should be one that
the depositions hitherto taken may be read by either party on the
-trial. The proper pecuniary measure of the redress to which the
complainant is entitled, is the fair value, in November, 1858, of a
copy of the play as performed at her theatre, with such a license,
authorizing its performance at the defendants' theatre, as she was,
according to the foregoing views, able to give.
If a jury should find, or a master should report, a sum exceeding,
with costs, the fund in deposit, and the report or verdict should be
approved, no final decree will be made until after a reargument, before a full court, of the question-first, whether the complainant is
entitled to any decree on the ground of literary proprietorship, and
if not, then, secondly, whether, on the ground of breach of confidence,
any other than merely preventive redress could, independently of the
payment of money into court, have been administered in the case.
If a report or verdict for a less amount should be confirmed, a
final decree may be made without a decision of either of these two
questions.
Since the foregoing opinion was written, I have seen a report of
a decision of Judge Sprague, in a case of Robertsvs. 31yers,' awarding a. preliminary injunction to prevent the unauthorized theatrical
representation of a play which was the subject of a copyright under
the acts of Congress. There had been a public theatrical representation of it before the adoption of measures to secure the statutory
copyright. He was of opinion, that, whatever might have been the
effect of a prior publication in print, the prior theatrical performance had not been such a publication as deprived the literary pro123 Law Reporter, 397.
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prietor of the play of the benefit of the dramatic author's copyright
act of 1856. Judge Sprague was also of opinion that this proprietor was entitled to the benefit of the copyright acts, though the play
had never been printed, and that he might sue in equity, though he
was only an assignee for a limited period of the exclusive right of
dramatic representation, and though certain places were excepted
from the operation of the assignment on which his title depended.
On a question of the proprietorship of a dramatic literary production alleged to have been composed by an agent for his employer,
the case was, in all essential particulars, the reverse of the present
case. The views of Judge Sprague, so far as applicable to the case
now before me, are confirmatory of those which I have expressed,
though, as frequently occurs under this head of doctrine, the relative uses of such words as publication, &c., may difter somewhat, as
their practical applications vary.
DECREE.-This cause having been heard upon the pleadings and
proofs and admissions, and arjue# by counsel, and considered by
the court, it appearing that the complainant's literary proprietorship of the comedy in question is derived from a non-resident alien
author, the court is of opinion that the complainant has no copyright therein or statutory right of exclusive dramatic representation
thereof. But, upon the points involved in the question whether,
independently of the statutes in that behalf provided, the complainant is entitled to relief, the court is of opinion, that, as the said
comedy has not been printed, and has never been published otherwise than by theatrical representation, and as the complainant's own
theatrical representations of it were not the means through which
the defendants were fairly enabled to represent it, their unauthorized
theatrical representation of it was such an infraction of rights of the
complainant as entitles her to relief. The court is further of opinion that the proper pecuniary compensation, for her indemnity in
the premises, is the value of such a license under her hand and seal,
accompanied with a fairly written copy of the said comedy, as would
have authorized and enabled the defendants, after adequate preparation, to bring out the said comedy at their theatre on the 22d of
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November, 1858, and represent it then, and afterwards, without
restriction or limitation, as it was, then and afterwards, there performed.
It is ordered that either party have leave to apply, within ten
days hereafter, for an issue to find the value of a license and copy
such as aforesaid.
The cause is referred to the Master, to inquire and ascertain the
difference between the average profits, at such a theatre, of performances of old or well-known plays, and popular new plays, and to
report the nightly profits of the actual performance of the comedy
in question, at the said threatre, and the number and dates of its
performances there; with authority to examine witnesses and parties, and order and compel the production of books, accounts, and
other papers, and return such material answers or deposition as either
party may request him to return.
If no issue shall have been ordered, the Master will report further
the pecuniary value of a license and copy such as aforesaid. In
ascertaining this value, he will take into consideration, so far as it
may benefit the defendants, the price which the complainant asked
for such a license when she asserted that she had a statutory copyright.
It is directed that if an issue shall be tried, all or any depositions
hitherto taken in the cause may be read, on the trial, by either
party, subject to the same objections as if the respective deponents
had been offered for oral examination as witnesses. And it is further directed that, if such an issue shall have been ordered, the
Master, so soon as he shall be able to report, in such manner and form
as may facilitate the trial thereof, those matters of which the discovery
may, in his opinion, be material to either party, for the purposes of
such trial, shall report the same accordingly ; confining his report,
where both parties do not request the contrary, to such matters of
account, or of detail, as cannot be investigated at such a trial without inconvenience, or undue delay.
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In the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, July Term, 1860, York
County.
ATHOS FELCH vs. ORRIN BUGBEE ET AL.

1. A discharge of a debtor under the insolvent laws of Massachusetts will not bar
an action in the courts of Maine, instituted by a citizen of Maine against such
debtor who resides in Massachusetts, although the contract was made, and by its
terms to be performed in Massachusetts.
2. The endorsement of a negotiable note is a new contract between the parties;
and where such note was made in Massachusetts, by a citizen of that State, and
payable to another citizen of such State, "at any bank in Boston," and by him
endorsed to a citizen of Maine, before maturity and before proceedings in
insolvency, the rights of such indorsee are not affected by a discharge of the
maker in Massachusetts, under the insolvent laws of that State.
3. It is citizenship, and not place of making or of performance, that determines the
legal rights of the pariies.
4. An assignment of such debtor's property by the officers of the law of Massachusetts, under the provisions of the insolvency act, will not operate upon debts or
property in this State, so as to defeat the attachment of a creditor who is a citizen of Maine, made subsequently to such assignment.

L. S. Moore, for plaintiff.
A.

.Chisholm and Hf. J. Swasey, for defendants.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
KENT, J.-The questions between the plaintiff and principal
defendants, relate to the effect of a discharge in insolvency granted
to the defendants by the proper tribunal under the laws of Massachusetts. It appears, from the inspection of the papers, that the
discharge was regularly granted, and by its terms includes the contract as set-forth in each of the notes in suit. The question arises,
whether such a discharge is effectual to bar this action.
Both notes were made in Boston, payable to defendants' own
order, and signed and endorsed by them to citizens of Massachusetts, who, at Boston, negotiated and sold them to the plaintiff
before maturity, and before the commencement of proceedings in
insolvency. The first of these notes contains no specification of
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any place of payment; the second is payable at any bank in
Boston.
The constitutionality, effect, and limitations of the insolvent laws
of individual States, have been discussed very thoroughly by courts
in different States, and by the Supreme Court of the United States.
Nearly all the questions which can arise have been determined, and
it would be but a useless effort to recapitulate the arguments and
the reasons on which these decisions are based, or to cite a cloud
of authorities already familiar to the profession. It may be useful,
however, to state the most prominent of the points, which may now
be considered as settled:
1. That a State has the constitutional power to pass insolvent
laws, in the nature of bankrupt laws, by which a debtor may be
discharged from subsequent contracts, subject to certain limitations.
Ogden vs. Saunders, 12 Wheaton, 213, and cases cited under the
following points.
2. That such discharge may be granted from all such contracts
made or existing between citizens of the State which enacted the
law, and whose tribunals granted the discharge. Stone vs. Tibbetts,
26 Me. 110. And a subsequent change of residence and citizenship, after making the contract, will not affect the validity of the
discharge obtained by defendant before removal. Stevens vs. Norris,
10 Foster, N. H. Rep. 466, and Brigham vs. Henderson,
1 Cush. 430.
8. That such discharge will not bar an action on a contract
between a citizen of such State and a citizen of another State,
where the contract is not by its express terms made payable, or to
be performed, in the State granting the discharge. Palmer vs.
Goodwin, 32 Me. 535; Savage vs. .larsh, 10 Mete. 594; _Fisk vs.
Foster, Ibid. 597; and Branardvs. i]farshall, 8 Pick. 194. This
rule applies, also, to cases of such contracts made in such last
named State, with a citizen of another' State, where no place of
performance is named. lsly vs. ferriam, 7 Cush. 242; Clark vs.
Hatch, ibid. 455; and Scribner vs. Fisher, 2 Gray, 43.
4. That a negotiable contract, payable generally and made
between citizens of the State granting the discharge, but endorsed

FELCH vs. BUGBEE ET AL.

bona fide to a citizen of another State, before maturity and before
proceedings instituted-in insolvency, is a new contract between the
parties, and a suit thereon is not barred by such discharge. Bancker
vs. Fisk, 33 Me. 316; Hfoughton vs. llaynard, 5 Gray, 522;
Savage et al. vs. Marsh et al. 10 Met. 594; Anderson vs. Wheeler,
25 Conn. 613.
5. That no peculiar rights are acquired or lost by the character
of the forum in which the suit is determined; but the same
principles apply, whether the case is pending in the State court
where the debtor resides and obtained his discharge, or in the State
of the creditor's residence, or in the United States Courts. Cook vs.
fofflatt, 5 Howard, 309.
6. That a contract which is payable generally, without any specified place, although dated and given at a place within the State,
is not barred by the discharge, if the contract is with a citizen of
another State. See cases before cited.
The first note, in this case, falls clearly within the class of cases
which are not barred by the proceedings in insolvency. The
plaintiff is and has been a citizen of Maine; the note was endorsed
to him when such citizen, before maturity or the commencement of
the proceedings in insolvency, and is not payable at any particular
place in or out of Massachusetts.
The second note presents another question, which has not been
determined with the same unanimity as those before stated. This
note is made payable "at any bank in Boston ;" and it is contended
that this stipulation takes the case out of the principles of the
former decisions, and makes it subject to the discharge offered in
evidence; and that a contract, although with a citizen of another
State, is barred if it is made payable in the State where the debtor
resides and obtains his discharge.
The other questions being disposed of, the only remaining one is,
whether the fact that the note is made payable in Massachusetts,
gives efficacy to the discharge, although the contract is with a citizen of another State.
We will first consider the authorities bearing on this precise point.
In Scribner vs. Pisher, before referred to, a majority of the court in
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Massachusetts decided that such a note is barred by a discharge in
insolvency in that State. This decision has been reaffirmed in
several cases decided subsequently in that court. 5 Gray, 509 and
522. No reasons are assigned in the subsequent cases. They rest
on the case of Scribner vs. Fisher,in which Judge Metcalf gave a
dissenting opinion, and may be considered as establishing the doctrine of that court.
In the case of Demeritt vs. .Exchange Bank, Law Reporter,
March, 1858, Judge Curtis held, "that it is not competent for the
State of Maine, under the United States Constitution, to pass any law
discharging or suspending the right of action on a contract made with
a citizen of another State by a citizen of Maine. This was settled
in Ogden vs. Saunders, 12 Wheaton, 213, and Boyle vs. Zacharie,
6 Peters, 348." "It is urged," says Judge Curtis, "that, where
the contract is to he performed in the State, it is not within Ogden
vs. Saunders. It has been so held in Scribner vs. Fisher, 2 Gray,
43. But I cannot concur in that opinion. I consider the settled
rule to be, that a State law cannot discharge or suspend the obligation of a contract, though made and to be performed within the
State, when it is a contract with a citizen of another State. Such
was Justice Story's understanding of the decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States in which he took part. Springer vs.
_oster, 2 Story, 387." Judge Story has also expressed the same
view of the law in his elementary works. In his Conflict of Laws,
§ 341-he says, that "a discharge, under any law of the State
where made, will not operate to discharge any contracts, except
such as are made between citizens of the same State." See also
Verz vs. -lellenry,29 Me. 214.
The Court of Appeals in New York, in 1852, in the case of
Donnelly vs. Corbett, 3 Selden, 500, had this precise question before
them; the contract being payable in South Carolina, where the
debtor resided and was discharged-the creditor being of New York.
The court held that an action on the contract was not barred by the
discharge. The ground of the decision was, that a discharge, under
a State insolvent law, of a debtor from his debts, contracted after
its passage, is valid as respects contracts between citizens of the
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same State, but invalid as to all contracts where a citizen of another
State is a party. The same doctrine is found in Poe vs. Duck, 5
Maryland, 1.
In Anderson vs. Wheeler, before cited, the case presented the
same question as the one before us. The original parties to the
note were both of New York; it was endorsed before due to a citizen of Connecticut; it was payable at a bank in New York, where
the payee obtained his discharge in insolvency. The court refers
to the case of Scribner vs. Fisher, but dissents from it, and decides
that the fact of the place of payment being designated does not take
it out of the rule as laid down in Judge Johnson's opinion, concurred
in by a majority of the court in Ogden vs. Saunders.
We have also the opinion of Judge Baldwin, of the Supreme
Court of the United States, in the case of Woodhull vs. Davis,
Baldwin's Rep. 300. His decision is based on the position, that all
bankrupt or insolvent laws can have no extra-territorial effect on
persons beyond the limits of the State or nation.
Judge Woodbury, in the case of Town vs. Smith, 1 Wood. &
Minot, 137, discusses fully the authorities bearing on the whole
question; and although doubting some of the views, and the soundness of the reasoning on which they are based, yet feels bound by
the authority of the cases in the United States Supreme Court,
which he understands as establishing the test of citizenship of the
parties.
The decisions which are in opposition to the cases in Massachusetts rest upon the understanding of the court of the doctrine in the
original case of Ogden and Saunders. All the courts, including
that of Massachusetts, State and National, agree, as a starting point,
that whatever is clearly and expressly decided in that case is to be
taken as settled-although the reasoning may not be entirely satisfactory. That case, indeed, resembles the works of some ancient
authors, where the commentaries, and doubts, and explanations
outrun the text and overwhelm it, leaving the bewildered student in
wondering mazes lost-oft-times the "interpreter being the harder
to be understood of the two."
The discussions and decisions have, however, resulted in bringing
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about a general agreement as to all the points first enumerated;
leaving this single point of the place of performance yet, in a measure, incontroversy.
The Supreme Court of the United States was called upon to revise and interpret the leading case of Ogden vs. 8aunders-and
the judges gave their opinions on the various questions raised in
Cook vs. llloffatt, 5 Howard, 809. Whilst there is an almost painful difference of opinion on the question of the soundness of the
grounds assumed and reasons assigned, the court concurs in fixing
certain principles as finally established. The one bearing on the
exact point before us is thus stated;-" A certificate of discharge,
under an insolvent law, will not bar an action brought by a citizen
of another State on a contract with him."
This is the state of the authorities on the subject. The preponderance seems clearly against giving efficacy to the discharge, in a
case like this.
If we leave the authorities, and seek beyond them for the reasons
on which any rule on this subject is founded, we find two trains of
argument, which, starting from different premises, lead to directly
opposite results. The whole controversy on this point seems to
turn upon the question whether it is the contract itself, including
the place of making and of performance, and the lex loci contraetus
that is to govern-or whether the citizenship of the contracting
parties is to control, without reference to the nature of the contract
and the place of making or performance. It is urged, by those
who favor the first view, that when a foreigner, or a citizen of
another State, voluntarily comes into a State and there makes a
contract with a citizen of the latter State, not by its terms to be
performed elsewhere, the lex loci attaches to the contract, and must
not only govern its construction but its validity, and the grounds
or facts by which it may be discharged. The argument is, that
every contract made has relation to the existing law of the State,
and (to apply the doctrine directly to the case before us) that, when
such a contract is made within the territorial jurisdiction of Massachusetts, that the liability to a discharge under the existing insolvent
laws becomes part and parcel of that contract, incorporated into it,
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or attached to it, as a condition or limitation, and goes with it everywhere-whoever makes or becomes a party to it at any time. In
this view, citizenship is of no consequence. The ground on which
insolvent laws of a State, which allow a discharge of a contract
fully, are sustained against the objection that they impair the obligation of contracts, and thus violate the provision of the United
States Constitution, is that above stated-viz: that the liability to
such discharge is either expressly or tacitly understood by the parties as a part of, or a fixed attendant on, all contracts made under
the overshadowing canopy of the statute of insolvency; and that
any citizen of another State, who comes voluntarily within the
territory thus embraced, must be held to contract with reference to
the law, and that its enforcement would not violate his rights.
If this were a new question, this view of the case would certainly
be entitled to great consideration. It will, however, be observed,
that the strength of this argument rests upon the doctrine of the
lex loci contratus-theplace of making the contract-not the place
of performance only, or chiefly. It is the fact of making a contract
on a territory governed by a certain law, that incorporates the law
into it, if it is thus incorporated. If it is not citizenship but place
that is to control, it would seem that those who favor this view
should have taken their stand upon the ground that every contract
made in the State, and not expressly to be performed elsewhere,
must be governed by the existing law. But this has been given
up by all the courts. Even the court in Massachusetts admits that
the fact of the contract being made in that State cannot bar recovery after a discharge in insolvency. The place of making is
treated as immaterial. Dinsmore vs. Bradley, 5 Gray, 487; Houghton vs. Maynard, Ibid 552; 10 Mete. 594, before cited, and several
other cases. This same court has also decided that a contract made
in Georgia, and there to be performed, between two citizens of
Massachusetts, would be barred by a discharge in Massachusetts.
March vs. Putnam, 3 Gray, 551.
The question naturally arises, why the place of performance of a
contract should subject it to the operation of a discharge, when the
place of its formation would not ? If the place of performance is
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material and must control, it must be because the party out of the
State voluntarily assented to the condition fixing the place-thereby
bringing the contract under the law of the State. The same reasoning would apply to the making of a contract which might be
performed in the State. It is conceded by the court in Massachusetts that the forum makes no difference-that the same rule applies
everywhere.
After a careful consideration of the reasonings and decisions of
the courts on this vexed question, we can only say, that if the question was an open one in all respects, we might incline to the doctrine
that the place of making and place of performance should control,
on the grounds before stated, rather than the fact of citizenship.
Yet we are forced to the conclusion that a different rule has been
finally established by the Supreme Court of the United States, and
concurred in by most of the State courts; and we are not disposed
to depart from the rule thus established. That rule is the one found
in Cook vs. Moffatt, 5 Howard, before cited. It rests entirely upon
the citizenship of the party, and not at all upon the place of making
or performance. It is the result of that train of reasoning which
regards the insolvent laws of a State as local, having no extra territorial force so as to act upon the rights of citizens of other States:
-that as between citizens of the State the discharge will bind
them, as to all posterior contracts, wherever made or wherever to
be executed; and as to citizens of other Statesit will not discharge any
existing contract, although made or to be performed in the State
granting the discharge. Or, as expressed by the court, the discharge
is not a bar ",when the action is brought by a citizen of another
State." This rule is broad enough to exclude all questions arising
either from the place of making or place of performance. It rests
entirely on the citizenship of the parties, and treats all other matters as immaterial.
The plaintiff must have judgment on both notes.
The remaining question relates to the trustees-who have disclosed indebtedness to the defendants, and notice to them of an
assignment made by the Judge of Insolvency in Massachusetts to
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the assignees, who now interpose their claim. By agreement of the
parties, all the questions are submitted to the court.
It was decided in .Fox vs, Adams, 5 Maine, 245, that a general
voluntary assignment by the debtor, for the benefit of his creditors,
made in another State, will not be allowed to operate upon property
in this State, so as to defeat the attachment of a creditor residing
in Maine. This has been the established law of our State.
A fortiori, an assignment by the officers of the law, under a
bankrupt or insolvent enactment of another State, cannot have that
effect. It is now the well settled Americin doctrine, that an assignment, by commissioners or other officers, of a debtor's personal
property, under a foreign bankrupt law, does not operate as a legal
transfer of that portion which is -within another jurisdiction, as
against the creditor of the bankrupt, there residing, who interposes
hi8 claim. Blake vs. Williams and Trustees, 6 Pick. 306; Story's
Conflict of Laws, § 410; Kent's Commentaries, 2 vol. 405; The
Watchman, 1 Ware, 232, and Town vs. Smith, 1 Wood. & Minot,
137.
The claim of the assignees in this case cannot prevail against the
attachment of the plaintiff:-the plaintiff and all the trustees being
citizens of Maine.

In the Supreme Court of Louisiana.
LEVICKS, BARRET & KUEN VS. A. J. WALKER.

A stipulation in a contract that the property of the debtor shall be sold without
appraisement, in the event of non-payment at maturity, is a pact which ought
not to be recognized by a court in the decree rendered upon such contract.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
MERRIoK, C.J.-This suit is brought upon a promissory note
executed in Pennsylvania, wherein the maker describes himself as
residing in Monticello, Carroll parish, Louisiana.
In the note, the defendant promises to pay without defalcation
and "without any relief whateverfrom the appraisement or valuation laws."

LEVICKS ET AL. vs. WALKER.

Plaintiffs claimed judgment in this form against defendant, and
the same being refused, thereupon they appealed.
We think the stipulation in a contract that the property of the
debtor shall be sold without appraisement in the event of non-payment at maturity, one of those pacts which ought not to be recognized by our courts in the decrees rendered upon such contracts.
The law has, by express provisions, ordained the mode in which its
own officers shall enforce the judgments of the courts.
Parties regulate their own conduct by their stipulations, but
they cannot prescribe rules of proceeding for public officers, nor
demand that the courts of justice shall depart from the usual modes
of enforcing their decrees. If, before judgment, the creditor may
stipulate the manner in which the same shall be executed, the principle will sanction an endless variety of modes of execution of judgments, and, indeed, the parties may waive all formalities and all
delay, and may even consent that some other person than the
sheriff shall sell the property of the debtor, and execute the decree
of the court. And if a decree giving effect to such contract be
legal, then also the sale under it would be legal, and other creditors might find themselves deprived of their common pledge
without notice. In view of our complicated system of mortgages
and privileges, and the restrictions upon sales where parties are in
insolvent circumstances, as well as the responsibility imposed by
our law on the sheriff and his sureties, we are of the opinion that
such stipulations ought not to be enforced. If they be not immoral, they may be considered as affecting the rights of others and
void, C. 0. 11, (concurring Justices Voorhies and Duffel.)
It is therefore ordered, adjudged, and decreed, that the judgment
of the lower court be affirmed, and the plaintiffs pay the costs of
the appeal.
BUCHANAN, J., separate opinion, concurring-I adopt as my own
the following opinion, which was prepared in this case by Mr. Justice Land, who is now absent.
The defendant is sued on his promissory note for the sum of
seven hundred dollars and eighty cents, which he stipulated to pay
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six months after date, to the order of the plaintiffs, without defalcation, and without any relief whateverfrom apprai8ementor valuation laws. There was judgment against the defendant, under which
he is entitled to the benefit of appraisement, by the law of this
State, and the plaintiffs have appealed and assigned as error the
refusal of the judge to render a judgment without the benefit of
appraisement as prayed for in their petition.
The plaintiffs are merchants, residing and carrying on business
in the city of Philadelphia, at which place the note was dated, and
was executed by the defendant without specifying any place of

payment. It is true, as contended, that the right to the benefit of
appraisement given by law to a debtor in case of the forced aliena.
tion of his property for the satisfaction of his debts, may be waived
by him, and his property sold at the first offering for cash, for
whaterer it may bring. , But the waiver in such a case must be in
a more solemn and authentic form than that of a mere promissory
note, otherwise the waiver would become a mere formula in such
instruments, and the entire policy of the law thereby defeated to
the injury of both debtors and creditors.
In the Suureme Court of Michigan, October Term, 1860. 1
EBER B. WARD VS. W rLIAM WARNER AND ANOTHER.'
1. The general nature of the action of assumpsit, considered.
2. A canal through a marsh in which a stream is lost, cut by private individuals
through the land of one of them, for the purpose of affording floatage for timber
and lumber through the same in connection with the stream-there being no evidence that the waters of the stream ever ran along its line, or that it was the
improvement of an existing water channel-is a private way, and the public are
not entitled to use it, unless it be dedicated to their use.
3. The owner of the land on which such canal was dug, and who appeared to have
incurred the major part of the expense of making it, gave notice to other individuals, who had contributed to its repair, that they must compensate him for its
use at a rate which he specified in his notice; and on their refusal, and continuing its use under a claim of right to do so, brought action in assumpsit to recover
compensation for the use.

Held, that the action could not be maintained.

IWe are indebted to the learned Reporter of Michigan for this case. It will be
found in 8 Mich. 508, which is still in press, but will be very shortly published.Eds. Am. Law Rev.
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4. The law will not imply a promise to make compensation for the use of the canal
before the notice was given, and while it was permitted by the plaintiff without
objection, and without demand of compensation.
5. Nor will the law imply such a promise after the notice, since any implication of
a promise is precluded by the denial by defendants of all right to compensation,
and the assertion of an adverse right in themselves. The adverse entry, if the
claim of right is unfounded, is a naked trespass, upon which no duty to compensate arises which can be converted into a contract.

Error to Wayne Circuit.
Ward brought assumpsit in the court below, against William Warner and Albert L. Catlin, and declared for the use by defendants of
a certain canal across lands of the plaintiff, in St. Clair county, in
floating the logs and lumber of the defendants in and through the
same. On the trial, the following stipulation was read in evidence:
"In the Circuit Court for the county of Wayne: Bber Ward vs.
Albert L. Catlin and William Warner.
It is hereby stipulated that on the trial of this cause it shall be
admitted, as follows:
That in 1853, the plaintiff, William Parker, and some other gentlemen, interested as owners of pine lands on Mill Creek, conferred
together about opening or digging a canal at the spot where the
canal now claimed by the plaintiff was afterwards built. That, with
a view of carrying out this idea, plaintiff bought certain lands
through which the canal now runs, the legal title to which is still in
the plaintiff. That in the summer of 1854, the plan was settled as
follows: It was estimated that the entire cost and outlay, of carrying out the entire enterprise, would be $5,000, which sum was
divided into five equal shares, of which the plaintiff was to pay one,
Willard Parker one, the Messrs. Moore one, Messrs. Smith & Dwight
one, and the remaining fifth it was supposed might be paid by other
parties. And the parties whose names are above mentioned all
agreed to the same. That after this was so agreed on, the plaintiff
proceeded and made a contract for building the canal, and cleaning
out a part of Mill Creek, and plaintiff paid therefor $5,000, the
contract price.
That the said Parker and the Messrs. Moore paid to the plaintiff
$1,000 each, as their share of the said outlays, and said Smith &
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Dwight have always acknowledged their liability so to do, but, having
failed in business, have been unable so to do.
That the object of making the said canal was to concentrate and
confine in a channel, so as to afford floatage for logs and rafts, the
waters of Mill Creek, which then, in that locality, were spread and
diffused over a large marsh. That said canal was dug and the waters
of said creek drawn through it in 1854, and have so continued to
run ever since ; and it now constitutes the bed and channel in which
said water of said creek runs.
That the waters of Mill Creek were, before the building of said
canal, navigable both above and below said marsh, and said canal
operated to carry said waters in a navigable channel through said
marsh. That said canal is about two miles long, about sixteen feet
wide, and four feet deep.
That large amounts have been expended by different individuals,
in cleaning out the channel of said creek, both above and below the
said canal.
That, in 1855, it was found necessary that the upper end of
the canal should be enlarged, to make the navigation more practicable, and that Mill Creek, below the canal, should be improved;
and that for these purposes the expenditure of $1,000 was necessary.
This work was done, and the amount contributed by the said Parker,
the plaintiff, the Messrs. Wrights, and the defendants, each paying
$250. Of this $1,000, about $250 was expended in the upper end
of the canal itself; the balance in the creek below.
That the first intimation the defendants had that claims were
made against any person for the use of said canal, was derived from
the printed notice, [copied below, marked B,] which was posted in
June, 1857. That no claim was made on defendants personally
till August, 1857, when an account was sent them, and payment
demanded. A letter of Towle, Hunt & Newberry, attorneys for
plaintiff, was handed them about September 4th, 1857, requiring
them to call and pay for the use of the canal, to which they responded by denying all liability, and insisting upon a right to its
use. That defendants never assented to any liability to pay for the
use of the said canal, but always claimed a right to the free naviga-
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tion of the same." [The stipulation then gives the quantity of logs run
by defendants through the canal, in 1856, 1857, and 1858, specifying the amount before and after the demand of payment, and
gives a statement, from which it appears that plaintiff expended in
buying said land, and in and about work on said canal, $7,802 08,
and received upon the same from Parker, Carlton, Smith, and Moore
& Foot, $8,091 48.]
The following is the notice, marked B.
"Notice.-All persons whohave run logs through the canal made by E. B. Ward
and others, in St. Clair and Lapeer counties, connecting Mill Creek, are hereby
notified that they will be charged 25 cents per 1000 feet for all logs that have heretofore been run or that may hereafter be run through said canal, until the tolls are
paid in advance, or arranged for with the subscriber.
"Parties owning lands above the canal may commute by paying a fair Vro rata
proportion of the cost of said canal, for the privilege of running logs from specified
lots without paying tolls.
-All parties having used the canal during the past year, are hereby requested to
call at their earliest convenience, and settle the tolls now due.
"E. B. WAnD.
"D"roiT, June 1, 1857."

In addition to these documents, plaintiff introduced evidence,
tending to show that the marsh through which the canal was dug
was not, before that time, navigable for logs, or rafts, or boards;
that it was extensive, covering about one-third part of a township;
and that the stream above had never been used for floating logs
before the canal was constructed. He also gave evidence of the
great value of the canal to the owners of timbered lands near it,
and as to what would be a fair compensation for the use of the
canal. The defendants proved by a witness that, before the canal
was made, the creek was lost in the marsh for a distance of some
two miles; that there were in the marsh one or two open spaces
filled with water, and he thought that perhaps the channel of the
creek had been, at some former time, at those spots.
The court instructed the jury.
1. In order that the plaintiff shall recover, he must show that
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there has been a promise, either expressed or implied, on the part of
the defendants, to pay for the use of the canal. It is not claimed
that there is an express promise. The question, then, is, was there
an implied promise?
2. If it were shown that Mill Creek ended in the marsh, and that
a new distinct stream came out below, then it might be that the
plaintiff, on digging a canal through the marsh over land owned by
him, might forbid parties using the canal, unless they would agree
to pay for such use. But if the jury believe, from the evidence,
that there had been at some former period a continuous channel
through what is now a marsh, which has been by some natural
means nearly filled up, and the waters diffused over the marsh, and
that the canal which was dug by the plaintiff had the effect simply
to concentrate the waters of Mill Creek, into one body, then the
plaintiff can not require pay for the use of such canal, or debar
others from using it on their refusing to pay.
3. Even if the plaintiff could require pay for such use, yet if the
jury believe from the evidence that the defendants used the canal for
floating logs, and that on being required to pay for such use, they
refused, and denied the right of the plaintiff to charge therefor, and
claimed the right to use the canal free of charge, then no promise
to pay can be implied. The defendants were at the most but trespassers, and no action of assumpsit will lie against them.
The jury returned a verdict for defendants, and the plaintiff
having excepted to the instructions, now brought error.
Towle, Hfunt and N9ewberry, for plaintiff in error.
). 0. .Uolbrook and G. V N. Lothrop, for defendants in error.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by
C. J.-The first question presented, and which disposes
of this case, is whether, upon the facts, assumpsit will lie, or whether
the plaintiff's remedy, if he have any, be not trespass.
Whenever a benefit accrues to a party, whether for services rendered, money expended, or property used, or from any other cause
upon which a duty to make compensation to another arises, the law
MARTIN,
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will, in the absence of an express promise to make such compensation, imply one from the transaction and the duty. Thus, if A
performs labor or renders services for B, at the latter's request, or
with his knowledge and assent but without a contract for compensation, the law will imply a promise by B to A therefor for what such
labor or services shall be reasonably worth. So when the goods of
A have been wrongfully taken or held by B, and sold, although the
act of B in taking them, or in their conversion, may have been tortious, yet as he has sold them and received a benefit from such conversion, A may waive the tort, and bring assumpsit for the price for
which they were sold. So when a party enters upon land under a
contract to purchase it, which is not performed, and such party is
after such failure of performance notified that if he remains in possession he will be required to pay rent, if he remain the law will imply a
promise to pay rent from the time of such notice. But, in the latter
case there can be no promise implied to pay rent for the occupation
while the contract was in force, because no payment of rent could
during that time have been in the contemplation of either party,
and no such duty existed. And where one has the clear right to
the use and control of property, and permits its use by others
upon condition of payment therefor, when the condition is specific
in terms, the law will imply from the use by one having knowledge
of the terms, an assent to them, and a corresponding promise to
pay; and when not known, a promise of reasonable compensation.
In the first case the implication is founded upon the knowledge of
the terms and conditions of the use, and in the latter upon the duty
arising from the use; but in neither will it be made when the party
using it asserts adverse rights, and acquires and uses the property
under an adverse claim of right. These are principles which, notwithstanding the diversity of opinion upon kindred questions, are
clearly settled and recognized. But we are not aware of any principle upon which it can be held that a mere naked trespass can be
made the basis of an implied assumpsit. If the trespass be proved,
no presumption of an agreement for compensation can be raised;
for the act of an entry upon lands is in contravention of, and not
in subordination to, the rights and claims of the party injured. For
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such injury the law has given a different remedy, and one founded
upon the injury; and no promise can be implied to pay, but a liability arises to compensate for the wrong and injury.
It was said in ifosmer vs. Wilson, 7 Mich. 294, that the liability
in cases of implied promises, is founded upon a duty, which the law
imposes upon the party receiving the benefit, to pay; and that this
duty the law enforces under the fiction of an implied contract; and
Martin, B., in Clay vs. Yates, 36 E. L. & E. 546, in speaking of
the liability, says: "I should say the dutyof the man to pay arises
out of the transaction itself; and think this is a more correct
expression than talking of an implied contract, when a contract was
never made."
If, therefore, the plaintiff has a right to require compensation for
the use of his canal prior to the notice of June 1st, from the simple
fact that the defendants have used it, then a duty arises upon their
part to pay such compensation, and the law will imply a promise
to pay; but if he has no such right, no duty to pay arises from
the assertion of such right, or from the fact of the use. Now
the canal, upon the case presented, was clearly a private way. It
is true that it was dug by contribution, and was for a time thrown
open to all passers, and perhaps still is, to those who contributed
towards its construction, or those who have since contributed
towards keeping it in repair. But it was nevertheless upon the
land of the plaintiff. No evidence exists, tending to show that the
waters of Mill Creek ever ran along its line, or that it was the improvement of an existing water channel. Indeed, the contrary is evidently the case ; and the fact that it was dug through a marsh (the
land belonging to the plaintiff) in which the creek was lost, does not
render it a part of the stream, so as to confer upon the public any
rights of way along it.
It exists, then, as a way or passage opened by the plaintiff, and
which he might dedicate to the public or reserve for his private use,
at his option. Whether those who joined with him in its construction have or have not the right of passage along it, or what their
rights may be, are questions not before us ; but so far, at least, as
all others are concerned, no such right exists, for no dedication to

WARD vs. WARNER.

121

the public is shown, nothing more than a sufferance of its use, which
he might revoke at any time. For its use, while this permission
existed, he had no right to demand compensation, nor will the law
raise a duty to pay it.
But he had a right to require payment or compensation, before
he would at any time suffer its use by individuals upon whom the
right had not been specially conferred ; and in such case those using
it would be liable to pay therefor, according to the terms imposed,
if assented to, or if used under circumstances from which the law
would imply assent. In Wadsworth's Administrator vs. Smith,
11 Me. 278, which was assumpsit on an account for shipping logs
along a stream, which had been made floatable for logs and lumber by the application of artificial means, at the expense of the
owner, while the right to exact toll was questioned, it was held that
a proprietor may open a passage through his land for his own
accommodation, and he may permit others to pass it under an
agreement for compensation, which may be enforced at law. " H e
may yield the enjoyment to one and refuse it to another. If he
receives compensation for such enjoyment, the law will permit him
to retain it; if he accept a promise as an equivalent, the law will
enforce it, and a promise may as well be implied in such a case as
in any other."
The plaintiff, therefore, having, until the giving of the notice of
June 1st, suffered the public to pass along his canal without objection, or making any demand for compensation, must be confined to
his claim upon such use of the canal as occurred after such notice.
For the purpose of revocation of the general license, and a declaration that compensation would thereafter be demanded, the notice.
having come to the knowledge of the defendants, was sufficient and
competent to impose upon them a liability to pay for its use, according to the terms of the notice, if subsequently used, had the right to
demand any compensation been acknowledged, or recognized and
not denied; for in such case the law will presume that they used it
upon the terms imposed, and raise the corresponding duty, and
imply the contract accordingly. But in the present case, all such
implication is precluded by the fact that the defendants denied any
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right to demand compensation for the use, and used 'it in defiance
of the plaintiff's claim, and under claim of right in themselves; and
they cannot therefore be presumed to have acceded to the terms
imposed.
If, then, any duty can be implied, it is to pay what such use is
reasonably worth. Now, as already remarked, the plaintiff had a
right to require payment, as a condition to the use of the canal;
and had he required such, but fixed no price, and the defendants
had used it with knowledge of such terms, and under the condition,
beyond doubt the duty would be raised to pay what such use would
be reasonably worth ; but if the effect of a denial of the right to
demand compensation, and a use of the canal in contravention of
the claims asserted by the plaintiff, will prevent the implication of
a duty to pay a specific rate imposed, how can it be said that it will
still raise the duty of paying according to its worth ? If the denial
goes to anything, it must go to the whole claim of the plaintiff for
compensation, and will preclude every presumption of the recognition of a duty upon which a contract can be implied; while, on the
other hand, if the law will imply a duty, it will imply one co-extensive with the terms imposed. It goes to the whole remedy, whether
for a specific price, or for reasonable compensation. But the law
implies the duty only where the right of dominion over the subject
matter is conceded, or not questioned; and never where the use is
under an adverse claim of right, or a denial of that asserted. In
such case, the entry, being adverse to the plaintiff, is a naked trespass, upon which no duty to compensate, which can be converted
into a contract, arises; for such duty can only be implied where the
conventional or implied relation of promisor and promisee exists, or
where the duty springs from such change of relation after the wrongful act, as in the case of the conversion into money of property
wrongfully taken, and the like. If he could be held to be a promisor in such case, under any implication of law, no valid reason can
be given why an intruder, under a claim of right, may not be so
held in all cases. The conclusion can not be avoided that in such
a case he can not be regarded in any other light than as a trespasser; for he not only enters upon the property in opposition to the
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notice of the owner forbidding it, except upon the terms of recognizing and responding to his right to require compensation, but also
under the assertion of a claim of right inconsistent with and adverse
to that made by the owner.
The subject of tolls, and the right of the plaintiff to collect them,
was very elaborately discussed in this case, but, under the views we'
have taken, it does not become necessary for us to consider it.
From the views already expressed, it follows that the defendants
in this case are mere naked trespassers, and no assumpsit can be
implied from their use of the canal; and this view renders it unnecessary to consider any other of the questions raised.
The judgment is affirmed.
CAMPBELL, J.,

concurred.

CHRISTIANCY,

J., also concurred in

the result.
MANNiNG, J.-I
think trespass, and not assumpsit, is the proper
action. Was the stream navigable before the canal was dug? The
defense is that it was, and that defendants, in common with other
citizens of the State, had a right to use it to float their logs. The
law will not imply a promise in such circumstances; for there is
nothing to base a promise upon; as defendants received no benefit
from the use of the canal, if their defense be true.
Assumpsit for money had and received is an equitable action,
and may be brought when one person has money in his hands that
in equity and good conscience belongs to another. But that is not
this action, which is assumpsit to recover compensation for the use
of plaintiff's canal; and, like assumpsit for goods sold and delivered, or for work and labor, will lie only on a promise, express or
implied.
When plaintiff's goods have been wrongfully taken, it is said he
may waive the trespass and bring assumpsit for goods sold and delivered. This may be so where defendant lays no claim to the
goods, and the trespass is wholly wanton on his part. But when
he claims them as his own, or claims a right to the possession of
them, and justifies the taking on that ground, trespass and not as-
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sumpsit is the proper remedy. In a case of pure trespass, by
which I mean one committed without color of right to the property
taken, the court may well say to defendant: You shall not be permitted to defeat the action by showing you took the goods without
intending to pay for them, or with an intention to do a wrong with
which the plaintiff, by putting a more charitable construction on
your conduct, has not thought proper to charge you. This, I
think, is all that is meant by waiving the trespass and suing for
goods sold and delivered. There is no objection to such a course
when the trespass is wholly separate from the right of property;
-but when it is mixed up with the right of property, and the question of trespass or no trespass depends on that right, and must
stand or fall with it, the trespass cannot be waived, because none is
admitted; and the law will not imply a promise to pay, as defendant took the goods in his own right.
The case at bar does not involve the right to personal property,
but the right of the public to an easement over plaintiff's land. If
the stream was navigable when the canal was dug, the public still
has a right to use it; otherwise not, unless it has since been dedicated to the public.
It was urged on the argument, as a reason why the court should
sustain the present action, that in trespass the plaintiff could recover nominal damages only. I do not think so. In trespass for
breaking and entering his close, he may allege and prove the use
of the canal by defendants as special damages.
Judgment affirmed.

